

FORE. POLL. DEPT. SECRET. E JUNE 1920, Nos. 1-152. contd.

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Except for a statement* made three weeks ago by King Hussein that certain events have occurred and Colonel Wilson's suggestion as to Ibn Saud's complicity we have

*Cf. Pro. No. 64. no material on which to base objection to ultimatum to latter nor has Colonel Wilson as far as I know submitted any corroboration documents regarding the alleged events nor (1 group undecypherable) as to further activities of the part of Ikhwan.

I propose, subject to approval of His Majesty's Government, to despatch Captain N.E. Bray now Political Officer at Bahrein to Riyadh shortly for conveyance to Ibn Saud of a message in terms stated in your Telegram,*
*Pro. No. 65. December 13th, should the situation on his arrival seem to justify it. Captain Bray was formerly on special duty in Hedjaz and is known to the authorities in Egypt.

But before sending him I should be glad to have somewhat more recent and if possible more reliable information than ex-parte allegations by King Hussein' the veracity of whose previous reports as to Ibn Saud is not such as to inspire confidence.

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FORE. POLI. DEPTT. SECRET E. JUNE 1920, Nos. 1-152. contd.

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Pro. No. 76.

Telegram P., No. 1961, dated the 28th (received 29th)
December 1918.

From-His Majesty's High Commissioner, Egypt, Cairo,
To-The Secretary to the Government of India in the
Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

(Addressed Foreign Office; sent to Baghdad).

It is reported by King of Hedjaz that he has suggest
to Bin Rashid that latter might, in case he has difficulti
in obtaining them from Iraq, purchase supplies from Yenbo
(Red Sea).

This refers to your telegram No. 1613.

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FORE.POLI.DEPTT. SECRET.E. JUNE 1920, Nos.1-152. contd.

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Pro.No.77.

Telegram P, Dated the 6th (received 7th) January 1920
From- His Majesty's High Commissioner, Egypt, Cairo,
To- His Excellency the Viceroy (foreign and Political
Department) Delhi.

A conversation at Jeddah with the head of the deputation sent by Bin Saud subsequently to Mecca, Mohammed-el-Negh el-Fatayah, is reported by Colonel Wilson. Man is intelligent and well acquainted with recent Arab politics and was for years in College at Beyrout. He impressed Colonel Wilson as reliable although he is evidently a keen partisan of Ibn Rashid.

There have been regular communications from Bin Saud Medina according to him. Last September Ibn Rashid was informed by Fakhri that he (Fakhri) had an agreement with Bin Saud and was advised to make common cause with latter against the Sherif of Mecca. Through Ibn Saud it was that Fakhri heard of secret negotiations between the King and Ibn Rashid. He believes that, in collusion with Fakhri, Bin Saud desires to enter Medina and to possibly induce some of the Turkish troops to enter his service after taking possession of the armament there. Reports as to the militancy of Wahabi movement which can only be checked by force and of its rapid progress are confirmed by him. Ikhwan have been joined by nearly all Ateibah and Muteri tribesmen and Bin Saud has declared that it is said that until he has repeated his grand father's

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FORE. POLL. DEPTT. SECT. E. JUNE. 1920. Nos. 1- 152. Cor

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Pro. No. 78.

Office memo., No 80, dated Delhi, the 7th Ja
1919

Transferred to the Secretary to the Government of I
in the Foreign and Political Department.

H.ST. CLAIT FREITS

for Asst. Private Secy. to t

Viceroy.

Dated C₂iro Residency, the 16th December 1918

To his Excellency the Viceroy, with the compliments
the High Commissioner.

.....

No. 328.

(5172/ 317.)

Sir,

15th December 1918

With reference to my telegram*No. 1881 of Decemb

*Pro. No. 66.

th~~e~~ I have the honour
forward copies of Colon:
Wilson's despatch and of

letter from King Hussein complaining of the raid by II
on the Emir Shaker's supply base at Bghab~~ah~~.

Copies of this despatch and enclosures have been

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FOREIGN POLL. DEPT. SECT. E. JUNE. 1920. Nos. 1- 152. Contd

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I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect

Sir,

Your most obedinet, humble :

The Right Honourable

REGINALD WINGATE.

ARTHUR James Balfour, O.M., M.P.,
&c. &c. &c.

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Copy.

No. 20.

(5172/ 315.)

KHURMA,

Jeddah,

Sir,

4th December 1918.

I have the honour to forward herewith translations
the letter and telegram from King Hussein to meself refer
to in my telegram No. W- 503, December 3rd the original
is being sent to the Arab Bureau by this mail.

I felt it most desirable that Your Excellency should
informed as fully as possible at an early date and there
telegraphed my view at length W-504, December 3rd) as the
despatch will not reach Cairo until December 13th.

King Hussein appears to be really nervous of the conse
ces of the present Ikhwan activity and to this appeal fo

FOREIGN POLICE DEPARTMENT. SECT. E. JUNE. 1-152. Contd.

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Great Britain had agreed to support him is, I understand not a fact. (Note by Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis, dated 10th September on King Hussein's letter to Your Excellency dated 28th August 1918.)

There appears to be only two courses open.-

(1) For His Majesty's Government to send peremptory to Ibn Saud to withdraw all Ikhwan from Khurma in from that in event of his refusal His Majesty's Government will stop his supplies and subsidy and may be compelled to break relations with him altogether; at the same time inform him of the King's written guarantee (see my despatch No. dated 24th November, to Your Excellency) and advising him to accept the principle of a suzerainty.

(2) For King Hussein and Ibn Saud to be left alone to fight the matter out between them,

These two courses are really similar to the 1 and 2 alternatives mentioned on page 3 of my note submitted to Your Excellency on 1st May 1918. The adoption of the first may I think entail His Majesty's Government's approval of "Suzerain policy", the adoption of the second would possibly lead to a general upheaval in Arabia and make any settlement in the near future extremely difficult.

Failing strong and successful pressure being put upon Ibn Saud now, I submit that King Hussein has no alternative

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he can collect, the situation is developing into a far more critical state for him to continue his defensive policy longer; by it King Hussein has lost considerable prestige among the Arabs regarding it as necessitated by fear and weakness. The longer he continues it the more Arabs will join the Akhwan either from necessity or because they consider Ibn Saud's the winning side, also the nearer the Akhwan will get to Mecca. It must always be remembered that if Emir Shaker's forces receive a crushing defeat the Akhwan will probably reach the near neighbourhood of Mecca and capture Taif, they are now only some 90 miles away from the former town.

It is ~~shortly~~ of note that well informed Wahabis who have no love for King Hussein, such as Mohamed Nasif, the sons of El Fadi (who were in prison at Mecca) state that they would far prefer King Hussein's rule to that of Ibn Saud and give it as their opinion (which they say is generally shared) that the reason for King Hussein acting on the defensive and pursuing a weak policy in the Khurma affair is his earnest endeavour to prevent fighting between Akhwan which endanger the realization of his struggle for eventual Arab Unity. They declare that as Ibn Saud's Emirate is based upon religion he could stop all Akhwan aggression if he wished to.

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During the last two and half years I have in letters King Hussein and in numerous conversation with him "whit washed" Ibn Saud and constantly urged conciliation on he former.

What real proof has Ubn Saud given to show his entire loyalty to Great Britain? On the contrary-as stated in despatch No 20.dated 24thg November 1918 to your Excellence he appears to have threatened to sever relations with us certain eventualities.

If Ibn Saud has been throughout throughky loyal and straightforward with us what is the origin of the inform given against him throughout Arabia from Aden to Damascu obtained from all kings of independent sources?

I submit that it is extremely likely that Ibn Saud has rosa" been trying to "run with the hare and hunt with th hounds"; the only other explanation (and an extremely improbably one) is that there is avery highly organised system of propaganda working against him throughout Arab

The great services rendered to the Allied cause by King Hussein's reveolt are well known and I submit that he ha given numerous proffs of his steadfast loyalty to Great Britain and never have I heard that even his own enemies ever accusedhim of playing us false; their only accusatio is that is he toofriendly and loyal with us.

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FOREIGN POLL. DEPT. SECT. E. JUNE. NOS - 1- 152. Contd.

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These are the two men between whom, - as it appears to
-His Majesty's Government must choose and choose quickly

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant

C. WILSON, Colonel,

His Excellency

General Sir Reginald Wingate,

G.C.B. G.C.V.O. G.B.E. &c, &c.

The Residency Cairo,

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Copy.

NO. 332.

His Excellency the British Agent, Jeddah.

My dear friend,

After dutiful respects I regret to tell Your Excellency
that the attack on the people of Dghabjah by the Akhwan
Shaker had referred to as being expected has been made
main supply base which is 4 stations (ie., 4 days) distant
from Meccan and 2 stations (days) distant from Taif to
north.

As a large quantity of supplies had luckily been sent
to Shaker there were only about 350 or 400 small sacks

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in the above-mentioned base which guards and retired after suffering a heavy loss. How can it be said that the matter would not be extended if I had written the letter requested to Ibn Saud. I must, therefore be excused if I say it is not a case of a letter which I would return or object to write to him, because everybody knows, that when His Holiness (Ibn Saud) killed Affas a Sheikh of the Ruqah, and sent 4 horses afterwards as a present with one of his chiefs called Saleh El Azl, which I returned and refused to accept his letters before all the Arabs, no more than six and a half months passed before he repented, took the next step to satisfy me and asked my forgiveness. This is sufficient (evidence) to judge both sides (i.e, whether to write a letter to Ibn Saud or not and whether or not to receive letters from him).

The bad result to which I have referred in one of my recent telegrams is commencing.

The mention of Great Britain's support, on the occurrence of a rising or internal disorder in the country due to envy on the part of the Emirs or caused by enemy intrigues, in our criminal decisions (agreements) proves that such a possibility was foreseen from the beginning. My purpose in mentioning this clause now is only to confirm my apprehension regarding the state of the country

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and its capacity for dealing (with such and similar occurrences). Therefore Great Britain should either inform Ibn Saud that if he will not disperse the muddayinah (Arab) as was stated in my last (mentioned therein) in any way within the period of 35 days she will sever relations with him or must accept my withdrawal (resignation) absolutely. This is all I can do. It is necessary that Your Excellency with your great knowledge will look upon this matter as being of supreme importance which must be considered.

Please accept my best compliments and respects.

Your most sincerely

28-2-37-(2nd December 1918.)

HUSSEIN.

.....

Copy

Telegram No. 178.

His Excellency the British Agent, Jeddah.

I have with great pleasure received Your Excellency's

*Copy sent by mail of 2nd December 1918.

letter* of 1st December (27-2-37) in which you informed us that His M.

's Government will be pleased when it learns that I have ordered Shaker to avoid fighting as much as he can in spite of everything. I beg most respectfully to inform Your Excellency that there cannot be any further room whatsoever