

with the Amier of Medjed and his subordinates
at the Wahabee Ports, and of holding them
directly responsible not less than the other
Chiefs and Principalities on the Arabian
Coast for any acts of which they may ^{be} guilty,
subversive of peace and tranquillity on the
High-Seas:— I trust therefore that I may
not be considered to have overstepped my
Province in addressing a subsequent Communi-
cation to H. E. Ey Ahmed Pasha, which I
had the honor to submit herewith to Your
Excellency in Copy and Translation—

Although it may not be denied that
since the Egyptian invasion of Medjed
in 1839/40, Amier Taysul has remained
tributary to the Turkish Authorities of
Mecca— his tribute being regarded probably
as an offering to the Head of the Religion—
It is certain that the Porte has never exercised
any jurisdiction, or attempted to extend
its Authority over that Country— Were
it otherwise, were a Turkish Administration
established capable of controuling the
Province, of restraining the Wahabees and
their dependents from the piratical &
practices for which they ^{are} once so notorious,
and finally of preventing or giving satisfaction
for any breach of International Law, such
a state of things might be no less conducive
to good order, as it would be certainly less
burdensome

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burdensome to the British Gov^t than
 the Maritime Surveillance which in the
 interests of Commerce ^{The British Gov^t} is now compelled
 to maintain in the Persian Gulf - But
 in point of fact the Porte has not the
 power to furnish or coerce its tributary,
 not a single Turkish functionary exists
 in the Country, and to judge from my own
 experience of the duties of the British
 Resident in the Persian Gulf I feel
 assured that were the relations of that Officer
 with the Amier of Medjed to be disturbed
 in a manner to withdraw the Mahabee
 Coast from his immediate supervision
 the effect must be highly prejudicial
 to the Policy which has hitherto obtained
 under the orders & sanction of H^r Majesty's
 Government in that Quarter -

I take the liberty here to invite Your
 Excellency's attention to my Despatch
 N^o 1 of 5th Jan'y 1859 referring to the
 connection of the British Government
 with the Chiefs and Tribes in the Persian
 Gulf. With respect to the case under
 discussion I possess no information as
 to the nature of the offence given by
 Sheikh Mahomed Bin Abdullah,
 a refugee Chief of Bahrein located
 at Qemmaum, but the Arab Chiefs
 being bound by their engagements to
 abstain

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abstain from the prosecution of hostilities
by sea in any form whatever looking
always to the British Resident for
redress in case of attack or molestation
on that element I deem it probable that
Mahomed bin Abdullab whether
or not supported by Ameer Faysul may
have sought to pursue a course of action
from which his opponent was debarred and
thus have exposed himself to retaliation
from the British Squadron -

I have the honor to be
(Sigs) A B Kemball
Acting Consul General
at Bagdad

(True Copy) ---

M. M. ...
Off. Agent in Turkish
Arabia

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Copy of a letter addressed to H. E. of
Alimud Daulat Pasha by Lt Col. W. B. Kimball
at McConnel Post at Bagdad N/ 31st Dec. 1861.

Adverting to Your Excellency's
letter dated 23rd Jumadee ul Awwal & 16th Jumadee
ul Akhir no probability now exists of a
Packet arriving from Bushire before
the departure of the Post to Constantinople
tomorrow - To obviate misapprehension
therefore I deem it my duty to state
to Your Excellency that having myself
for a long time held the Office of
British Resident in the Persian Gulf
I am aware that that Officer has hitherto
and always maintained direct relations
with Ameer Faysul, the Ruler of Medjed
as well as with all the Chiefs and
Principalities situated on the shores
of that Sea -

Of the Policy of the British Govt
in the Persian Gulf, Your Excellency
is fully apprized; - It seems only
necessary for me therefore to remind
Your Excellency that in the prosecution
of that Policy The British Government
has

वर्षाधिकार, सुराजत राष्ट्रीय वानिज्याना
सायत सरकार के माधीन

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No. 203. From the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay,—No. 529, dated Simla, the 23rd May 1866.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 4th instant, No. 99, submitting the explanation which Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly, supported by the Government of Bombay, desires to offer of his recent proceedings in the Persian Gulf, with special reference to those points on which the Government of India has animadverted in the terms of my letter, No. 266, dated 14th March last.

2. In reply, I am desired to intimate that the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, having fully considered all that the Bombay Government and Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly have advanced on the subject, cannot admit that the explanation is satisfactory.

3. The Government of India fully acknowledges the general merits and good service of Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly, and has no doubt that in the particular instances in which his conduct has been commented on, he acted in his opinion for the best; but that he acted judiciously the Government of India cannot allow.

4. Whatever may have been the former practice of our Officers stationed in the Persian Gulf, and the extent of the authority which they used to exercise, it is obvious that at the time of Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's deputation to Muscat circumstances had much changed. The Indian Navy had been broken up, and therefore, unlike his predecessors, Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly had no Naval force at his discretionary disposal. It is true that he was accompanied by a Man-of-War of the Royal Navy, but both the nature and the duration of the service on which such vessels might be employed were expressly limited by the instructions received from Her Majesty's Lords of the Admiralty. Furthermore, he ought to have considered that the Officer in Command of Her Majesty's Steamer the *Highflyer*, however superior as a seaman of more varied experience to the Captains of the late Indian Navy, was yet for local duties a Coadjutor to whose independent action it was not fair to entrust too much. Captain Pasley could have no special knowledge of the coast of the Persian Gulf, or of the character of the Arab population, or the strength of the Ports on the seaboard, or their means of defence. And therefore Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, ought either not to have sent the *Highflyer* against Kateef and Demaan, or himself to have accompanied the expedition.

5. Passing to the 14th paragraph of Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's explanation, the Governor General in Council still thinks that it would have been more judicious to have addressed the Wahabee Chief in less peremptory terms and to have given him more time to make good the losses which, it is alleged, the Hindoo merchants had sustained. Indeed, the Government of India go further, and considers that such a demand should not have been made at all without the express authority of the Governor General in Council, or, at any rate, of the Government of Bombay.

6. Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's demand on the Arab Chief of Soor appears to admit of more satisfactory explanation. It is now stated that

समाप्तिकरि सुखदुःख राष्ट्रिय प्रसिद्धतायाम्

सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धतायाम्

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the compensation for the losses sustained by the Hindoos at this place had been demanded for upwards of a month before chastisement was inflicted. Of this, the Government of India was not previously aware. Commodore

* See paragraph 4, letter dated 20th February, to the Government of Bombay.

the first that had been made.

7. In conclusion, I am to observe that although the Government of India is referred to the correspondence between the Government of Bombay and Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly for an answer to the specific enquiry† what authority that officer had for making war on the Wahhabees, those papers certainly contain no such authority. If from

† First made by telegraph on the 23rd February, and subsequently repeated by special letter on the 14th March.

the silence of the Government of Bombay on this point the Government of India is to understand that Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly had a *carte-blanche* to act to the best of his judgment, it is not improbable that the Governor General in Council would from the first have been disposed to make somewhat greater allowances for the difficulties of that Officer's position. But in that case I am to point out that the Government of Bombay owed it to the Government of India not to have invested any Officer with such extraordinary powers until the previous consent of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council had been explicitly obtained.

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