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POLITICAL—A

*Telegram from Secretary to Government,
Bombay, dated 14th June 1865.*

Proceedings, June,
No. 96.

SIMLA RECORDS.

Blockade of Aboothabee deferred in obedience to
instructions.

Expedition to Bhamo.—Despatch from S. of S.

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No. 97.

No. 88, dated 21st May 1868.

From—Secretary of State for India.

To—Government of India.

I LEARN with satisfaction from the Foreign letter of your Excellency's Government No. 42, of the 13th March last, that Captain Sladen's exploring party had reached Bhamo, and entered into amicable arrangements with the frontier Chief of the Khakyen tribe, through whose territory the party were next to pass.

2. I approve the communication which you caused to be made to Sir R. Alcock, requesting him to facilitate, as far as possible, by suitable explanations at Peking, the passage of the party into and through the Chinese dominions. And I am glad to observe that you have, in accordance with the desire expressed by Her Majesty's Government, reiterated your orders that Chinese territory shall not be entered without the previous sanction of the authorities.

सहित
कॉपी राइटिंग
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Fresh intrigues in the interior of Oman.

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No. 195.

No. 233, dated 6th October 1868.

From—C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to Government, Bombay.

To—W. S. SETON-KARR, Esq., Secy. to Govt. of India, Foreign Dept., with G. G.

I AM directed to transmit, for submission to His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the enclosed copy of a despatch* from the Political Agent at Muscat, reporting the occurrence of fresh intrigues in the interior of Oman, endangering the peace of the province.

* No. 412, dated the 17th September 1868.

No. 196.

No. 412, dated 17th September 1868.

From—CAPTAIN G. ATKINSON, Acting Political Agent, Muscat.

To—C. GONNE, Esq., C. S., Secretary to Government, Bombay, Poona.

I HAVE the honor to enclose a copy of a telegram forwarded this day to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, and to add a few words describing the principal characters alluded to therein.

2. Saleh bin Ali of the Al-hārth is a dangerous intriguer, and appears to be always fomenting disturbances. He was implicated in Syud Burgesh's affair at Zanzibar, but, having played a double part throughout, managed to make a good thing of it. Last year he was one of Syud Toorkee's principal supporters, when, having had his share of the plunder of Muttra, he did not scruple to receive money from Syud Salim to desert Syud Toorkee, which he did at a most critical moment, and thus contributed greatly to the latter's discomfiture. He is avaricious to a degree, and his only motive in moving in this affair is extortion. In fact, I hear he openly gives out that if Syud Salim invites him to Muscat, and makes it worth his while, he would undertake to calm the present agitation.

3. Syud Hillal is connected by marriage to the reigning family. He warmly supported His Highness on his first accession, and thus incurred the hatred of Syud Majid and Syud Toorkee, the late Sultan's brothers. His Highness has, however, suspected him of disaffection for some short time, but I do not think with any just cause. As he is a great friend of Kulleylee's, who, it appears, is in some way concerned in the present movement, His Highness's suspicions have been now revived and increased.

4. The influential Moolah, familiarly known as "Kulleylee," is Shaik Saeed bin Kulfan, of the Kulleylee tribe, and is one of the two high priests of the Henavis of Oman; Mahomed bin Sulacem of the Garbi tribe being the other. It is not known for certain, in my opinion, that the former holds views dangerously hostile to His Highness, but the latter is certainly of that opinion, and further believes that Kulleylee is anxious to gain the co-operation of his colleague, Mahomed bin Sulacem. If he succeeded in this, the matter would be serious indeed, as the Henavis, who seem to keep aloof at present, would certainly all take part in the movement if it were fomented and encouraged by their chief priests.

5. But I do not think matters have come to this pass, and I cannot yet believe that Kulleylee has the intention attributed to him, as he has been considered, till hitherto, one of His Highness's warmest supporters. There has certainly been an estrangement between them of late, as His Highness Syud Salim is far more liberal in his ideas than the other likes to see him;

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(2)

Fresh intrigues in the interior of Oman.

but this is not considered so serious as to be beyond the reach of reconciliation. In any case, the present plot seems still to be in embryo, and His Highness will have ample time, while the Moolahs are consulting, to prepare to defend his throne.

6. He has already called on the various Ghaffree tribes in the neighbourhood of Muscat and on the sea-coast near Soor to assemble here without delay, and my only fear is, that his slender resources will be exhausted long before he will have any use for his troops. These constant alarms injure His Highness and Muscat as much as direct attacks, for they not only compel the former to keep a large body of men on foot, but also grievously affect the trade of the place. Muscat was about half deserted when I came here, and since then it has still further declined. If His Highness does not teach his rebellious subjects a lesson should they now attempt to capture any of his towns, and resorts to his customary plan of buying off all those who threaten him, we must expect a constant renewal of such alarms throughout his reign. This must tend to the ruin of Muscat, as, when trade once leaves a place, it seems seldom to return to it.

7. His Excellency the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council may in the meanwhile rest assured that, with or without a ship of war, I trust neither British subjects nor their property will be endangered. We have now a strong force in the Gulf, and I could summon assistance from thence in a short time.

8. I trust that this hasty Report will be excused, as I have hardly had an hour to pen it before the departure of the mail. Should I receive any further authentic intelligence of a serious character before the departure of next mail, it shall be communicated by telegraph.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1868.

From—Acting Political Agent, Muscat.

To—Resident, Bushire.

SULTAN reports mischief brewing in interior. Saleh bin Ali of Al-harth collecting Moolahs to support Azan bin Ghes of Rostack. Complicity of latter very doubtful; conflicting rumours prevalent as to object of Moolahs meeting at Semayel. Some say not political, but to divide a bequest left them by a brother of Syud Hillal's, who died at Zanzibar. The Henavis appear to keep aloof from the movement. The Sultan, however, thinks Syud Hillal and Kulleylee are implicated. In my opinion, no immediate danger, but Sultan is in want of money and cannot raise any. He has sent for reinforcements. I give you this crude statement, as I think it best to take advantage of Gwador steamer and save a fortnight, but I think matters are not far enough advanced to warrant alarm.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

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S.I. 192-193.

Muscat Affairs.

write to Bombay, Bombay will communicate with Calcutta, and from Calcutta references will be made to England. This will occupy six months. Meantime the *Prince of Wales* will be ours."

3. Government will, I feel, permit me also to mention that British subjects, in their anger at seeing the *Prince of Wales* stopped, said—"If Government do nothing now, we will go to the Consul and have our names struck off the list of British subjects." The above was not uttered in my presence, but was reported to me from a reliable source.

4. I trust that if action be determined upon by Government, timely notice will be conveyed to me. This remark is submitted owing to the insult offered our flag, also because fanaticism, on sudden and serious provocation, might arise, and the lives of British subjects be imperilled.

5. The safest and simplest course of all would, to my judgment, be the despatch to Muscat of a powerful man-of-war, possessing on board, besides her complement of marines and men, a contingent of two, or three hundred European soldiers, making a total effective force (for landing purposes if actually necessary) of six or seven hundred Europeans, all told. Five hundred would probably be sufficient, but is it not prudent to be on the safe side? Hence the suggestion deferentially offered. It is not improbable that were the English Government to threaten Azan with hostilities, Azan would find but few to support him. But we may count upon this. Whatever is done, should be done, I submit, with caution, else British subjects may once more be made prisoners, and perhaps be treated with violence. Of course landing and hostilities on land are opposed to our policy, and I know will be avoided if possible.

6. Time admits not of further by this mail.

P.S.—This letter penned in great haste. Pardon untidiness thereof. Affairs wear not a pleasant aspect. The presence of a Royal Navy vessel, pending final intentions of Government, is, to my judgment, advisable, and calculated to keep the authorities in check. Something ought at once to be done.

P.S.—Copy of No. 491, Political Department, will be sent to Colonel Pelly. Government can decide on sending or not sending copy of this.

No. 193.

No. 1463, dated Simla, 9th October 1869 (Confidential).

From—C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., Offg. Secy. to Govt. of India, Foreign Dept., with G.-G.,
To—C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to your letter No. 383, dated 20th September 1869, and other communications relative to the affairs of Oman, I am directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to observe that, from a careful perusal of Colonel Disbrowe's numerous letters, His Excellency in Council entertains grave doubts whether that officer is gifted with all that tact, temper, and good judgment which the Political Agent at Muscat should possess in the present critical state of affairs at that place.

2. His Excellency in Council thinks it his duty therefore to suggest to His Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council whether it might not be desirable to transfer that officer to some appointment for which he may be better qualified, and to appoint to the Agency at Muscat some other gentleman who might be supposed to possess in a higher degree the qualifications necessary for the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of that important post.

3. Should His Lordship in Council adopt the suggestion made by the Governor-General, it is hoped that the change may be made in a manner as

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JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1869.

Muscat Affairs.

S.I. 194.

No. 194.

No. 351, dated Simla, 18th October 1869.

From—Government of India,

To—HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Secretary of State for India.

IN continuation of our despatch No. 290, of the 9th September last, we have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a further correspondence with the Government of Bombay relating to Muscat affairs.

2. Your Grace will observe from these papers that affairs in Oman are in an unsettled state, and that we have deemed it prudent to suggest to the Government of Bombay the transfer of Colonel Disbrowe to some appointment for which he may be better suited; and the appointment to the Agency at Muscat of some other gentleman possessing in a higher degree the qualifications necessary for the discharge of the duties of that important post.

3. We have expressed a hope that the change may be effected in a manner as little hurtful as possible to Colonel Disbrowe's feelings.

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सर्वोच्चकार, भारतीय राष्ट्रीय अभिलेखागार

संस्कृत विभाग

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Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's deputation to Muscat to report on the state of affairs there.

No. 35. From C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Secretary to Government of India, in the Foreign Department, Fort William,—No. 174, dated the 18th November 1865.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 165, dated the 28th October last, relating to the position of affairs in Oman, I am directed to report, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that, as time is of importance, this Government has, in anticipation of the instructions of the Government of India, directed Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Pelly, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to proceed to Muscat and enquire and report fully on the actual state of affairs between the Wahabees and their neighbours on the coast.

2. Copy of a letter from His Excellency the Governor accrediting Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly to His Highness the Sultan of Muscat is enclosed for submission to the Governor General in Council.

3. I am desired to add that His Excellency in Council can safely rely on Colonel Pelly's judgment and experience not to commit the Government of India in any way, till he receives definite instructions as to the views and wishes of the Governor General in Council.

No. 36. Khureeta to HIS HIGHNESS SYUD THOWEYNEE, Sultan of Muscat,—dated Bombay Castle, the 18th November 1865.

I HAVE the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Lewis Pelly, an officer of rank and experience, and high in the esteem and confidence of the British Government, with whom your Highness is already personally acquainted, has been charged to proceed to Muscat for the purpose of making careful enquiry as to the state of affairs between the Wahabees and their neighbours on the coast of Oman.

2. I am confident that your Highness will afford Colonel Pelly every assistance in the enquiries which he may find it necessary to make in carrying out the orders of my Government.

3. I trust that your Highness will continue to favour me with frequent intelligence as to your affairs, your wishes, and your welfare.

(Sd.) BARTLE FRERE.

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the other States of Arabia (which were all in subjection to the Wahhabee), and that we desired only to provide for the security of the general commerce of the seas, and of the Gulf of Persia in particular, so long and so unjustifiably interrupted by the Joasmees."

3. Wahhabees invade Oman.—In April 1811 the Wahhabee troops appeared 1811 in the vicinity of Muscat, attacking and plundering the possessions of the Imam :—

"The Imam represented on this occasion to the Bombay Government that his co-operation with his friends and Allies, the English, in the late expedition had involved him in a perpetual and implacable war with the Wahhabees, with whom he was before at peace, and trusted that the British Government would not remain neutral during the struggle which he was making to defend his possessions and capital from the invasion of an ancient and inveterate enemy, whose resentment had thus been strongly re-excited against him.

"But the Supreme Government answered the Imam that it was unnecessary to regulate his reply to any overtures on the part of the Wahhabees by reference to his connection with the British Government, which had always considered itself to be at peace with that tribe, the late co-operation with the Imam not having been in prosecution of war against the Wahhabees generally, but merely for the extirpation of the pirates, whose augmented power and audacity had endangered the security of his own dominions, as well as interrupted the commerce and navigation of the Gulf; that the British Government, therefore, was no further interested in the contest between him and the Wahhabees than as it was solicitous for the welfare and prosperity of the Imam. Under the influence of that solicitude, and a just sense of the benefits and blessings of a state of peace, it was recommended to the Imam to grant the terms of pacification solicited by the Wahhabees if consistent with the honour and security of the State of Muscat."

4. First Egyptian invasion of Nejed.—The relief, however, which we were indisposed to afford came at this time to the Imam indirectly, and from an unexpected quarter. The Wahhabees

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were themselves assailed from the westward by an Egyptian invasion. Saood, who was then the Wahhabee Ameer, found himself obliged to gather in his forces from frontier operations, and even to make overtures of peace and amity to Persia and British India. His Envoy waited on the Political Agent at Bushire and "communicated the anxiety of his master to form a connection with the British Government of mutual amity and friendship, such as might be beneficial to both States, and that the ports of each nation might be open to each other, and a free and unmolested trade be carried on by their subjects.

"These overtures having been submitted to Bengal, the Supreme Government deemed it inexpedient to negotiate any Treaty, or to form any intimate connection with the Wahhabee Chieftain, but considered it politic to maintain a friendly intercourse with him, and to endeavour, by a cordial and conciliatory conduct, to confirm the amicable disposition which he professed to entertain towards the British Government."

5. Apparent annihilation of the Wahhabee Power.—Meanwhile the troops of the great Egyptian Pasha, Mahomed Ali, had taken Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, and Taif, and on Saood's death in April 1814 the power of the Wahhabees in the Holy territory was annihilated. Saood was succeeded by his son Abdoollah. After a temporary relaxation of their efforts the Egyptian troops again moved forward in 1818, being led this time by Mahomed Ali's brave and skilful son, Ibrahim Pasha. The siege of Dereyeyah, which was then the Wahhabee capital, began on the 6th April, and after five months' severe fighting Ibrahim Pasha carried the place by assault. He utterly destroyed the city, levelling all the fortifications, burning all the houses, and even cutting down the date trees upon which the

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population mainly depended for their subsistence. The Ameer Abdullah was sent prisoner to Constantinople and there decapitated. So complete was the overthrow of the Wahhabee power, that an historical sketch of the sect drawn up by Mr. Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay about the year 1820, concludes in the following terms:—

“Thus rose and fell, it is to be hoped never to rise again, the extraordinary sect of the Wahhabees, under whose protection and encouragement maritime depredations were carried on in the Gulf and in the Indian Seas with a degree of success, audacity, and barbarity, which has been surpassed only by the atrocities of the Algerines in Europe.”

6. Resurrection of the Wahhabees under Toorkee.—But Mr. Warden's anticipation was by no means realised. There was plenty of vitality remaining in the sect, and after six years of Egyptian domination a general insurrection was headed by the son of the late Ameer, Toorkee bin Abdoolah, or as he is more commonly called, Toorkee bin Saood. The Egyptian Governor was compelled to fall back on Kaseem, and Toorkee was unanimously proclaimed Sultan of Nejed and restorer of the Wahhabee power. The restoration of Dereyeeyah was neither practicable nor desirable; so Toorkee fixed on the neighbouring town of Riad as his capital and fortified it. These events happened in 1824, and Wahhabeism from that time entered on a fresh career of aggressive expansion. Toorkee soon opened a correspondence with all the Shaikhs on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, inviting them to renew the relations which had subsisted between them prior to the overthrow of the Wahhabees by Ibrahim Pasha. As a consequence of this overture Shaikh Sooltan bin Suggur, the Chief of the Joasmees, in

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November 1825 brought to the notice of the British authority in the Persian Gulf his "great alarm at the increasing power and intrigues of the Wahhabees, and professed himself very anxious to learn whether he might look to the English for assistance in the event of his endeavouring to maintain his independence.

"In reply, he was informed, in general terms, that he was the best judge of his own interests; but that no connection or authority would be received by the British Government as an excuse for any proceedings bearing a predatory character. The Shaikh then adverted to the very difficult dilemma into which he would be cast in the event of the Wahhabees attacking the territories of the Imam, and calling on him for his support against that Prince. To this he was answered, that his forming any connection prejudicial to His Highness would be considered unfriendly by us, and it was in every point of view advisable that he should not adopt that line of conduct. The language held on this occasion was confirmed by the Governor in Council, with a further intimation, that however improbable it might be that we should act against the Wahhabees so long as they confined their conquests to the shore, it was still not desirable that we should bind ourselves to abstain from interposition, or hold out so great an encouragement to the invasion of the Imam's territories as our avowed indifference would be likely to afford."

7. Toorkee's complete success.—The following five or six years were occupied by Toorkee in reconstructing his father's kingdom, and in recovering one after another the provinces formerly subject to Wahhabee rule. At the same time he endeavoured to conciliate the Pasha of Egypt by the payment of a small annual tribute. In 1831 his recovery of Hasa and Kateef so alarmed the Imam of Muscat, that that Chief was fain to be taken under his protection on the terms of acknowledging his supremacy and paying an annual tribute. And thus the whole

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of the Arabian Coast from Ras-ool-Hud to Koweit (with the exception of Aboothabee) became tributary to the Wahhabees.

8. **Overtures to British Government.**—About the middle of the year 1831 a communication was made to the Governor of Bombay by the Wahhabee Chief, through Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, expressive of his desire to be upon the same intimate footing as that formerly existing between the British Government and his ancestor Saood. To this a reply in general but friendly terms was transmitted through the Resident in the Persian Gulf.
9. **Insolence of a Wahhabee Agent.**—Toorkee's subordinate officials, however, do not seem all of them to have been imbued with the same respect for the British Government. For in 1833 1833 an application made by us for the restitution of some property plundered by Joasmees from a vessel belonging to a British subject was met by a most intemperate letter from the local Agent of the Wahhabees; and on our dispassionately pointing out the justice of the claim, the Agent replied that as his master Toorkee was the supreme power in Arabia both by land and sea, it was to Toorkee that all complaints of piracy should be referred.
10. **Claim of Muscat to British protection against the Wahhabees.**—In the following year a strong Wahhabee army having advanced into Oman, 1834 the Government of Bombay submitted to the Government of India whether the perilous position of the Imam of Muscat and our interest in the stability of his kingdom did not demand the utterance of so decided a threat to the Wahhabees as to pledge us, in the event of their not heeding it, to support our views by armed interference. The Bombay Government at the same time

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suggested that a representation to the British Minister in Egypt might possibly be of some use. The reply of the Supreme Government was as follows:—

“The Right Hon’ble the Governor General in Council is not prepared to sanction the employment of the British arms for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the continental possessions of the Imam of Muscat. If we were once to commit ourselves by a declaration of our intention to support that Chief, this line of policy must be followed up at any expense, and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and treasure which might ensue in consequence.

“The Wahhabees evidently exist in considerable force, and the Imam has acknowledged their ascendancy by entering into tributary engagements with them, and engaging to hold his forces at their disposal for carrying on offensive operations against their enemies. If both parties are left to themselves, a sense of mutual interest will probably lead them to abstain from carrying to extremity any differences that may hereafter arise between them; whereas, if we were to make an offer of military assistance to the Imam, he would probably avail himself of the support of our alliance to rid himself of the burden of the connection which he has been forced to enter into with the Wahhabees, and we should become involved in a series of distressing operations, carried on at a distance from our resources and under great disadvantages from the heat of the climate and the nature of the country, against a brave people with whom we have ourselves no cause of dispute of any kind.

“Our concern is only with the maritime commerce of the Gulf, and as long as that is not molested it matters not to us whether one power or another holds dominion on its shores. Even if the Wahhabees were to get possession of the harbour of Muscat, an event, of which the Imam himself does not appear to entertain any apprehension, it does not of necessity follow that they would commence a system of piracy. It is more probable that, being already sensible, from their recollection of past events in the Gulf, of our maritime superiority, they would dread to provoke us, and, as they would, under the circumstances supposed, have taken their place as a substantive power in that quarter, that they would be glad to continue the

same friendly connection with us which has always subsisted between us and the Imam.

"It is believed that the Joasmees and other Arab tribes in the Wahhabee interest are even now possessed of establishments in the Gulf, but we do not hear of any piracies being committed by them. They are probably restrained by the fear of our well-known ability to punish them, and this salutary dread would be likely to have even a greater influence over their conduct than it has at present, after they become possessed of a port like Muscat with a flourishing trade and other interests at stake which they must sacrifice by provoking hostility with us.

"But even if the worst contingency that can be supposed likely to take place were actually to happen, and the Wahhabees were not only to acquire possession of the port of Muscat, but also to commit acts of piracy upon the Gulf trade, it is conceived that it would be much cheaper and easier to chastize them under these circumstances than to take up the question in its present state and constitute ourselves the guardians of the possessions of the Imam of Muscat against all his enemies. In the former case the whole extent of our operations would be comprised in such measures as might be deemed most advisable for the purpose of putting down piracy, while in the latter we might become engaged in a system of continental warfare, the final result of which it would be impossible to foresee. In the former case we should know exactly how far we should be committed, we should engage with all the advantage arising from our maritime superiority, and, under Providence, success would certainly attend our efforts; while in the latter we should abandon our vantage ground to fight the Wahhabees in their own country, we should unnecessarily provoke the hostility of a free and powerful people, and should be involved in difficulties from which we could not retreat with honor.

"On the whole His Lordship in Council considers it fortunate that it has been so clearly established by the result of former discussions that we are not under any defensive engagements with the Imam of Muscat, and it is requested that the British Authorities in the Gulf may be instructed to observe a strict neutrality in any disputes that may arise between him and any of his neighbours on the

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Continent of Arabia. From a reference to the 15th paragraph of Mr. Warden's memorandum, dated 17th February 1826, it will be observed that this line of policy is in strict accordance with that which was prescribed by the Supreme Government when the Imam solicited our aid against the Wahhabees after the expedition against the Joasmee pirates in 1808, on the plea that owing to the assistance he afforded us on that occasion they (the Wahhabees) threatened to overwhelm him. At present so far from entertaining such an apprehension, he appears to rely with a considerable degree of confidence on his Treaty with them, and the main purport of his communication to Mr. Blane was to enquire how he was to act in case they called upon him to engage in hostile measures against neighbouring States. Mr. Blane's answer was marked by great judgment, and it is hoped that if the Imam adopts the prudent course recommended to him by that gentleman, he will not be subjected to any serious difficulty from his connection with his new Allies."

11. **Toorkee murdered by Musharee.**— But the difficulty in which the Imam and we as his Allies were involved was almost immediately solved by the occurrence of events in Nejed, which effectually diverted the Wahhabees from schemes of foreign invasion. Toorkee this year was assassinated by his nephew Musharee, and the murderer usurped the government.
12. **Musharee executed by Feysul.**— This usurpation, however, was short-lived; it lasted only until Toorkee's son Feysul, who at the time was conducting military operations near Kateef in Hasa, could return to Riad. Musharee was then executed, and Feysul succeeded his father as Sultan of Nejed.
13. **Feysul assumes the kingdom.**— Feysul was about 34 years of age. He at once applied himself to restore order in the central provinces, where recent events had thrown everything into confusion.

REFERENCES TO FORMER CASES. Rf. R. Nos.

Polit. A., Sept. 1869, Nos. 159-164.
 " Oct. " " 34-37.

GOVT. OF
 INDIA. }

1869

{ FOREIGN
 DEPT.

S. I.

3656

Nos. 290-304.

Attack on Bahrein by Mahomed bin Khuleefa.

LIST OF PAPERS.

- Nos. 290 to 292.—From Secy., Bombay Govt., No. 416 of 4th Oct. 1869—Forwarding, with reference to the telegram from the Polit. Resident, Persian Gulf, to the address of the Govt. of India, of 16th Sept. 1869, and previous telegrams, copies of letters from Colonel Pelly regarding the above attack.
 Enclos. to above.
- Nos. 293 & 294.—From Secy., Bombay Govt., No. 437 of 15th Oct. 1869—Forwarding copy of a letter from the Polit. Resident, Persian Gulf, regarding the affairs of Oman, and stating that these papers will be forwarded to the Secy. of State.
 Encls. to above.
- Nos. 295 & 296.—From Secy., Bombay Govt., No. 448 of 22nd Oct. 1869—Forwarding, in continuation of previous correspondence, copy of a letter, with accompaniment, from the Polit. Resident, Persian Gulf, connected with the piracy of Mahomed bin Khuleefa at Bahrein.
 Encls. to above.
- No. 297.—From Secy., Bombay Govt., No. 454 of 23rd Oct. 1869—Stating, with reference to letter No. 448 of 1869, regarding the piracy of Mahomed bin Khuleefa, that that Govt. propose to authorize Colonel Pelly to issue the Notification suggested in the concluding para. of his letter, and adding that the *Hugh Rose* will be ordered to Bombay for repairs.
- No. 298.—Tel. from Govr. of Bombay to the Viceroy of 12th Nov. 1869—On Bahrein affairs. Informing that Colonel Pelly has been ordered to proceed to that island with vessels named under command of Capt. Douglas of the *Daphne*. Suggestions as to instructions to that officer, and asking for reply by telegraph.
- No. 299.—Tel. to Govr. of Bombay of 13th Nov. 1869—Instructions as to Col. Pelly's several recommendations in respect of Bahrein affairs.
- No. 300.—To Secy., Bombay, No. 1605 of 13th Nov. 1869—Forwarding copy of a telegram to the Govr. on Bahrein affairs, and intimating that it is desirable that the intimation to be made to Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran should proceed from Col. Pelly in the manner prescribed by Her Majesty's Govt.
- No. 301.—Tel. to Govr. of Bombay of 13th Nov. 1869—Directing that Col. Pelly be instructed by telegraph to notify, also by telegraph, to the Minister at Teheran, for the information of the Shah, that under orders of the Govt. of India he is about to call the Chief now in possession of Bahrein to account for breach of maritime peace and unprovoked attack on Ali bin Khuleefa, and stating that a reply to the remainder of telegram will be sent shortly.
- No. 302.—To Secy., Bombay, No. 1607 of 14th Nov. 1869—In reply to previous letters relative to the state of affairs at Bahrein, reviewing the circumstances which have rendered it necessary for the British Govt. to call the Chief now in possession of the island to account, and conveying instructions and remarks as to Col. Pelly's recommendations in this matter and as to attack on Wahabee ports. Noticing the delay in putting the Govt. of India in possession of views of Bombay Govt., and adding that communication by telegraph on such important subjects is disadvantageous, and should not be resorted to when there is time for a reference by post.

REFERENCES TO LATER CASES. Rf. R. Nos.

*B. Hall I Oct. 1869 — 26/28.
 St. manuscript — 225/227*

TAKEDS.

KEEP-WITHS PRINTED.

(1) & (2) Notes on the case, No. 302.

KEEP-WITHS NOT PRINTED.

Printed letter No. 448 from Bombay, with enclosure, Nos. 295-296.
 Printed letter No. 454 from Bombay, with enclosure, No. 297.
 (3) Letter No. 1607 to Bombay Govt., No. 302.
 M.S. Notes by Secy. of 21st Oct. 1869, Nos. 290-304.

№ 90.

No. 416, dated 4th October 1869.

From—C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to Government of Bombay.

To—C. U. ARCHERSON, Esq., Offg. Secy. to Govt. of India, Foreign Dept., with G. G.

WITH reference to the telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to your address, dated the 16th ultimo, and previous telegrams, regarding the attack on Bahrein by Mahomed bin Khalifah, I am directed to forward to you, for submission to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, the accompanying copies of letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly dated the 11th and 17th idem, Nos. 165 and 171.

№ 91.

No. 165, dated 11th September 1869.

From—LIEUT.-COL. L. PELLY, C.S.I., H. B. M.'s Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to Government of Bombay.

IN my letter now noted, I have the honor of reporting some movement on the Wahabee coast of Kateef, and my consequent apprehensions for the Island of Bahrein.

No. 141, dated 16th August 1869.

2. In a subsequent communication, I transmitted a Report* of my 1st Assistant, whom I had detached to Bahrein to observe and report on board *Dalhousie*,

* No. 159, dated 23th August 1869.

the only vessel at my disposal.

3. A few days ago the household slaves of the Bahrein Chief, Ali bin Khalifah, arrived at Bushire in an open boat, and stated that the ex-Chief, Mahomed bin Khalifah, had surprised the island with a party of Bedouins from the Wahabee coast, and had killed their master, Ali bin Khalifah.

4. To-day I have received a letter from one Syud Majid, being the person whom the Bahrein Chief was wont to depute to me on important matters, and his statement and that of the confidential agent who brings me his letter confirm the statement of the slaves.

5. The main facts of this piracy, as collected from the above sources, appear to have been as follows:—

It will be in the recollection of Government that in April last the Chief of Bahrein, finding his brother, Mahomed bin Khalifah, intriguing, deported him to Kowait, where he subsequently resided. But when the recent excitement on the Kateef coast commenced, Mahomed quitted Kowait, and landed at Kateef, in view to being near Bahrein, and ready to avail himself of any opportunity for mischief. He then got into communication with a relative named Nassir bin Mobarik, who, having in former times been expelled Bahrein, had been living with his following for many years on the Kateef coast. These two Chiefs then applied to the Wahabee Governor of Kateef to aid them in a descent on Bahrein, but the Governor refused to aid openly. They then, and by the prospect of plunder, induced certain Bedouins of the Howajir† tribe (being a tribe of the Wahabee wilds near Kateef) to join in the proposed raid.

† It seems that Nimar had married a woman of this tribe.

6. Meantime, however, I had sent the steamer across to Bahrein to watch events and support the Chief. Mahomed bin Khalifah, therefore, postponed his piracy until the steamer should leave Bahrein. She remained about a fortnight off the island, and immediately after her departure, Mahomed with his confederate seized and plundered some seven or eight‡ small craft on the Kateef coast,

‡ Numbers indefinitely stated.

embarked their own followers and the Bedouins, and made a descent on the westward or inland coast of Bahrein. Hence they marched to a fortress called Ruffah, in the interior,

Vide my letter No. 125, dated 14th October 1863.

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and either induced or compelled its holder, a Chief of some repute, named Mahomed bin Abdoollah bin Ahmed,* to join them.

7. The Bahrein Chief, Ali, secure in his consciousness of adhesion to the terms of the maritime truce, had permitted the larger number of his men to embark for their pearl fisheries; and it seems that even to the last moment he was incredulous that his brother, Mahomed, could be so audacious as to attack him by sea.

8. At length, however, he sent out two of his sons with a party. These fell in with the invaders on the march. A skirmish ensued; one of Ali's sons was killed, and the other retired with his party to give warning to his father.

9. The Chief then went out himself, but appears to have been deceived into supposing that Mahomed had only a few men with him. Hence the Chief marched on Ruffah with a small party, and without waiting to collect the numerous force at his disposal. At Ruffah some negotiation, or at least parleying, seems to have commenced; and it is stated that Ali had hold of his brother's hand when suddenly a fight commenced on the part of the Bedouins and followers, and the Chief, Ali, was treacherously wounded and afterwards beheaded.

† This son was fighting for his uncle, Ali, and against his father. A son of Mahomed bin Khalifah was wounded, and a son† of Mahomed bin Abdoollah bin Ahmed, together with some other Chiefs to the number of twelve, were killed; a considerable number of Bedouins and followers also fell.

10. Mahomed bin Khalifah, Mahomed bin Abdoollah, and Nassir bin Mobarik then entered the two chief towns of Bahrein, viz., Manemah and Moharrag.

11. But at this point a difference appears to have arisen between these Chiefs. Mahomed, being desperate, was for plundering every one, and in particular British subjects. The other two Chiefs, it seems, were averse to extreme measures, and declined to injure our subjects or their property, the rather since these subjects had hoisted the English flag on their houses.

12. Mahomed, however, was reckless, and his Bedouins from the mainland plundered‡ everywhere.

‡ The extent of injury done to the property of our subjects requires further enquiry. It seems they saved their pearls and valuables, and that any plunder must have been of heavy goods in the caravanseerai.

13. Our subjects, together with the merchants and residents of Manemah, then retired to Kateef, where they now are, Mahomed proceeded to Moharrag, and the other two Chiefs continued in Manemah.

14. Subsequently it seems that whether from apprehension of the English Government objecting to the piratical attack by sea and the butchering of a Chief living under the protection of the maritime truce, or whether from a similar apprehension that our Government might object to their subjects being plundered, Mahomed bin Abdoollah and Mobarik turned on Mahomed bin Khalifah and imprisoned him. The latest reports are to the effect that they have now killed Mahomed.

15. The Steamer *Dalhousie*, the only vessel now employed in the Persian Gulf, is expected at Bushire to-morrow,§ and Captain Way will then return at once to Bahrein, in view to embarking our subjects, if they so wish, and to affording general aid.

16. It is credibly stated that the Bedouins and all the plundered property are still in the Bahrein Island, or on board small craft in its shallow creeks and harbours. But as both the marine gun-boats are still lying in Muscat harbour, and are practically beyond my control, it is impossible for me to avail myself of

|| Clyde and Hugh Rose, vide my Reports No. 130, dated 21st July 1869, para. 11, No. 141, dated 16th August 1869, and para. 16, No. 161, dated 11th September 1869.

* I suspect this Chief of playing a deep game for the destruction of not only Ali, but also of the other Chiefs of the bin Khalifah family. His object would be to succeed to the Chieftainship himself. The late Chief Ali leaves many sons, one of whom, Esau, is highly spoken of, and is of mature age. He is, however, wounded, and, perhaps, a prisoner with Mahomed bin Abdoollah.

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their services. The ships of Her Majesty's Indian squadron are, I presume, as usual at this season of the year, employed in the suppression of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa.

17. Deplorable as the reckless act of piracy now sketched has proved in its destruction of property and butchery of a Chief living peaceably under the truce, Government will yet remark that it differs essentially from any raids yet reported. In those raids the subscribers to the truce themselves broke its conditions, and had to be coerced, whereas in the outrage now perpetrated, it is a subscribing Chief and his subjects who suffer.

18. The fact is, that during the pearl season now concluding the maritime Chiefs have, one and all, rigidly observed the peace. In other words, we have gained a point where these Chiefs perform their part in the tracial contract: and whereas it seems to me we are bound to maintain the means at hand for fulfilling ours, we may possibly have no longer to use force against the tracial Chiefs; but we may have to protect them from sea aggressions by outsiders, and to arrange sudden quarrels among their followers at sea, or on the pearl banks.

19. I am respectfully of opinion that at the earliest convenience of Government a vessel-of-war, together with *Clyde* and *Hugh Rose* (these boats being *essential* for the shallows), should be sent to the Gulf to mark the displeasure of Government in regard to the recent piracy at Bahrein. If this be not done, it can hardly be expected but that the tracial Chiefs should argue that, sooner than trust to our protection, they had better protect themselves.

20. The manner in which this displeasure should be marked would of course depend on circumstances. If, as seems possible, Mahomed bin Khalifah be already killed, it would be unnecessary to trouble more on his account; and it would remain only to settle the Chieftainship of Bahrein in a manner best suited to the commercial and other interests of Bahrein; and to provide that our subjects should be reimbursed for their losses, and that the principal accomplices of Mahomed should be punished as may seem advisable and practicable.

21. If Mahomed be still alive, we should, I think, demand his surrender, and blockade the islands until he be given up, when he might be sent to finish his career on the roads in the Andaman Islands.

22. It does not appear that the Wahabee Government in any way openly encouraged or sanctioned Mahomed's piracy.* At the same time, the Bedouins who put to sea are under the authority of the Wahabee Ameer, who might be called on to punish them conformably with the tenor of his agreement entered into in April 1866. But this part of the matter might lie over until our subjects are removed from Kateef.

23. While sincerely grieving for the late Chief, Ali, I cannot conceal from myself that he has, by persistence in an extreme generosity or an over-confidence, largely contributed to bring his fate on himself. When in the autumn of 1868 his brother was expelled, I repeatedly begged Ali, and also the Guttur Chief, to cause Mahomed bin Khalifah "to be seized and made over to the Resident." Subsequently, when the Chief prayed that Mahomed might be permitted to reside in Bahrein, I again expressed my wish that he "were not only out of Bahrein, but out of the Gulf." Again, when the Chief found his brother intriguing in Bahrein and deported him, I suggested to the envoy how preferable it would have been to hand him over to me. But the Chief seemed unable to believe that his brother,

* I have just received a letter from the Wahabee Ameer (translated purport appended) giving strong assurance of his not allowing this subordinate to move by sea. This letter gives me an occasion for addressing him concerning the present raid, 12th September.

सर्वोच्च न्यायालय
भारत सरकार के कार्यालय
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with whom he had been associated for a generation or more, would venture to infract the peace at sea, or personally injure him.

24. I regret the present disturbance all the more, since the first of a line of mercantile steamers, invited to Bahrein by the late Chief, was actually on her passage to that island, when I had to apprise the British Indian Steam Navigation Company's Agents of the advisability of refraining for the present. At the same time, the obstruction is, I hope, but temporary, and there never was a season when I had reason to be so satisfied with the peaceful behaviour of the trucial Chiefs as I have this year.

25. But for this satisfactory condition of affairs to continue, it will be necessary that Government fulfil their protective part in the trucial contract; and for this a suitable force, at the disposal of one head, is requisite in these waters. On this subject I have already deferentially urged all that I could submit without appearing importunate or presumptuous.

Vide No. 104, dated 19th June 1869; also No. 141, dated 16th August 1869.

No. 486, dated 12th September 1869.

From—LIEUT.-COL. L. PELLY, c.s.l., H. B. M.'s Political Resident, Persian Gulf.
To—CAPTAIN A. COTTON WAT, 1st Assistant Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

REFERRING to my letter as per margin, and to my despatch to Government,* which you have perused, concerning the recent piracy at Bahrein, I have now the honor to request you will re-embark on board *Dalhousie* and proceed to that island, in view to collecting more detailed information, and to affording all practicable aid to our subjects and other sufferers from the recent attack on the town of Manemah.

No. 451, dated 10th September 1869.

* No. 165, dated 11th September 1869.

2. Our subjects at Kateef had better come on board; you can address them accordingly.†

3. I enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Sheikhs Mahomed bin Abdoollah and to Nassir bin Mobarik, and which you can send to them by a native boat on your arrival off Manemah.

4. If either of these Chiefs desire to come on board, you will give him safe conduct, but you will not allow any armed boat to approach the ship; the boat coming off should be met at one hundred yards from the ship by ship's boat, in which the Chief and one or two followers should then be brought on board.

5. You will not allow any person belonging to the ship or your following to proceed on shore under any pretence whatever, or any ship's boat to approach the shore.

6. If the Chiefs desire to explain, listen to them patiently, make notes, and, when they have freely finished, inform them you will communicate what they have said to me.

7. It seems not impossible but that Mahomed bin Khalifah is killed. If this be so, ignore him.

8. If he be alive, advise the other Chiefs to surrender Mahomed forthwith, but make no conditions beyond assuring them that his life will be spared, and that he will be sent to Bombay.

9. You will on no account commit *Dalhousie* (which, though carrying guns, has no crew able to use them, and is for all practical purposes unarmed,) to any hostile movement.

10. When you have collected your information and got our subjects on board, or made for them such arrangements as they wish and may be practicable, you can either return to Bushire, or report by native boat, as you may deem most expedient.

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11. When our subjects have left Kateef, you can forward the enclosed letters to the address of the Kateef Governor and the Wahabee Ameer.

12. Meantime you should send, without delay and by an express native boat, a polite note from yourself to the Kateef Governor, quoting to him the Ameer's assurances to me, and requesting him (the Governor) to take immediate and effective measures for causing the Howajir pirates to be apprehended and their plunder restored.

13. Nine household servants (who have taken refuge in the Residency) of the late Chief, Ali, should go on board *Dalhousie*. It is likely they may wish to return to Ali's sons; if so, please let them go. But if they be in fear of leaving the ship, do not compel them to do so.

14. As regards Ali's son, Esau, it would be desirable to get him on board, or at all events free of Mahomed bin Abdoollah, if practicable. But it might at the same time risk his personal safety if we showed any great interest in this matter.

Dated 12th September 1869.

From—LIEUT.-COL. L. PELLY, C.S.I., H. B. M.'s Political Resident, Persian Gulf.
To—SHEIKH MAHOMED BIN ABDOOLLAH BIN AHMED and NASSIR BIN MOBARIK.

I HAVE heard of the recent piratical raid by sea and of proceedings at Bahrein, and the British Government will doubtless do what may behove them in the matter. I await their commands.

Meantime I sent a Government steamer with my Khaim Mukam on board to receive the British subjects who have been plundered and expelled Bahrein.

Sic in orig.

I call on you to restore all plunder, be it the property of whom it may. I call on you also to replace in their houses or caravanserais* all property of the banyans or other British subjects.

* *Sic in orig.*

I advise you also to surrender Mahomed bin Khalifah forthwith, and send him on board the steamer.

Further words are at present unnecessary. If you desire to speak with the Khaim Mukam, you can proceed on board the steamer, and you will have safe conduct so long as you are on board, or going to and from the vessel.

Dated 15th Jemadi-ool-Awal 1286 (24th August 1869).

From—ABDOOLLA BIN FUYSUL-AL-SAOUD.
To—The Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I RECEIVED your letter and understood its contents, and what you said about Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah and his brother and Nassir bin Mobarik. You should have no doubt in your mind that I should wish any evil to Ali. I really have no intentions about him. My relations with him are of a most friendly character. Indeed, he is under my protection. My hand can reach to Bahrein if needful. From ancient days to the present I receive tribute from thence. On this account I have no wish for anything to be done, and being on friendly terms, I wish to remain so. But Jaber bin Khalifah and Nassir bin Mobarik came to me, and I could not agree to their wishes, and I sent them off, and I wrote to the Ameer at Khateef to prevent them or others from proceeding towards Bahrein. When I received your letter I sent an order to the Ameer at Khateef to absolutely stop their moving."

Dated 12th September 1869.

From—LIEUT.-COL. L. PELLY, C.S.I., H. B. M.'s Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Wahabee Ameer.

I HAVE received your Highness' friendly letter of 15th *Jemadi-ool-Awal*, in which your Highness assures me as follows :—

“About Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah and his brother and Nassir bin Mobarik. You should have no doubt in your mind that I should wish any evil to Ali. I really have no intentions about him. My relations with him are of a most friendly character. Indeed, he is under my protection. My hand can reach Bahrein if needful. From ancient days to the present I receive tribute from thence. On this account I have no wish for anything to be done, and being on friendly terms, I wish to remain so. But Jaber bin Khalifah and Nassir bin Mobarik came to me, but I could not agree to their wishes, and I sent them off and wrote to the Ameer at Kateef to prevent them or others from proceeding towards Bahrein. When I received your letter, I sent an order to the Ameer at Kateef to absolutely stop their moving.”

I am obliged by these assurances. But it is with great regret I have to observe that, while your Highness' letter was actually in course of transmission to me, your Governor of Kateef failed to prevent your tribe of Howajir from putting to sea in boats drawn from Kateef or its neighbourhood, and thence making a piratical attack on Bahrein, where, in company with Mahomed bin Khalifah and Nassir bin Mobarik, both of whom also embarked from the Kateef coast, they butchered the Bahrein Chief, Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah, killed also his son, plundered his town of Manemah, plundered the British subjects there residing, and compelled these to leave the island.

Your Highness no doubt is aware of your engagement of 1866 with the British Government not to permit your subjects to move by sea against our allies. Your Highness is aware also that the British Government is the guardian of the maritime peace in these waters.

I have in a friendly manner to express my conviction that the Howajir tribe will be severely punished and made to surrender their plunder, and that your Governor of Kateef will be called on to explain his conduct in allowing his coast to be made a base for murderous piracy.

I send a copy of this letter to your Kateef Governor, so that he may lose no time in explaining his conduct and recovering and making over to me the plunder taken from Bahrein.

I trust to hear of your Highness' welfare, and doubt not you will favour me with a reply at your early convenience.

No. 292.

No. 171, dated 17th September 1869.

From—LIEUT.-COL. L. PELLY, C.S.I., H. B. M.'s Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to Government of Bombay.

I BEG to enclose a copy of a telegram, which I submitted to Government on the 7th instant, concerning the piracy of Mahomed bin Khalifah at Bahrein.

2. I presume that His Excellency in Council transmitted the substance of this telegram to His Excellency the Viceroy in Council, as I have had the honor to receive from the Foreign Secretary to Government of India a reply to my telegram, copy of which I beg to enclose, as also a copy of my reply to the Foreign Secretary.

3. In the event of Her Majesty's Secretary of State according to the request of His Excellency the Viceroy, I would respectfully suggest that Commodore Heath may be communicated with, in view to arranging any

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It is advisable that you leave Kateef and come on board Her Majesty's Steamer *Dalhousie* with the least possible delay.

If you choose to remain on shore after this intimation, you do so at your own risk.

Dated 21st September 1869.

From—MIRZA MAHOMED HASSAIN.

To—PURSOO, British Subject.

I AM directed to inform you that the *Dalhousie* will leave to-morrow for Bushire.

NOTE.—Pursoo came on board and was warned to leave.—A. C. W.

From those residing at Bahrein to the Government, dated ^{Jemadi-a-thani 1286} 22nd September 1869.

THIS petition sets forth the wishes of the people of Bahrein.

For some years the Government has caused the maritime truce to be observed, and has prevented breaches of the peace and kept off enemies, and has not permitted one to oppress another. This has specially been the case in regard to Bahrein and its Ruler, as the tribes of the coast have been kept quiet and not allowed to move. This has been most satisfactory, as the people of Bahrein have not been able to protect themselves, and have trusted to the Government keeping off exterior enemies.

Last year Sheikh Mahomed bin Khalifah oppressed the British subjects and his Bahrein subjects until his brother, Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah remonstrated with him, but Mahomed would not listen to his advice, and the people of Bahrein applied to Colonel Pelly, Resident, Persian Gulf, to put Ali over them as Ruler. The Resident acceded to the request, and Sheikh Ali was made Chief.

By this Ruler's manner of conducting affairs all went on pleasantly, and the people were obliged to the Resident, and prayed for the prosperity of the Government.

In the month of Rubi-a-thanee mischievous persons collected at Kateef. The ports hereabouts are under control of Abdoollah bin Feysul. They also got together some Bedouins that owned allegiance to Abdoollah bin Feysul of the tribe of Beni Shafi, Chief of the Howajirs, and others.

Abdoollah bin Feysul directed them to obey the orders of Nassir bin Mobarik, whatever these might be. It was given out then that they intended proceeding to Aboothabee. But their true intention was to make for Bahrein and seize and plunder it of all that was in it.

Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah sent his Vuzier, Syud Majid, to Bushire to inform Colonel Pelly of what was going on. This officer sent over a steamer with Captain Way to Bahrein, where the vessel remained some time. There Captain Way wrote to all the Chiefs under Abdoollah bin Feysul on the coast that none should put to sea with intention of proceeding to Bahrein, and forbade a breach of the peace at sea; it then seemed as if the intention of invading Bahrein had been abandoned, and the people of Bahrein rested in peace, as they imagined they were under the protection of Government, and that their families, children, and goods were secure.

When the vessel proceeded on to Bassidore, the Chiefs of the Howajir of Shafi's family, with Nassir bin Mobarik bin Abdullah bin Ahmed, embarked at night from Kateef and Nowahika, and arrived at Bahrein, where they disembarked together with Mahomed bin Khalifah.

A part of Ali bin Khalifah's force at Bahrein was composed of Bedouins of the Howajir tribes, the rest being islanders.

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The former sympathized with Mahomed bin Khalifah, and went over to see him at Ruffah. They then returned to Ali bin Khalifah and told him to prepare himself. These Bedouins were disloyal to him. Mahomed bin Abdoollah bin Ahmed, who was living in Bahrein, also went off to meet the nephew of Nassir bin Mobarik. He also was a traitor to Ali bin Khalifah, and killed him with his son, Ibrahim. It would be too long to give the details of this affair. After the death of Ali bin Khalifah, all the Howajir with their Chiefs, and Nassir bin Mobarik, Mahomed bin Mobarik, with all their followers, entered Manemah, Mahomed bin Abdoollah accompanying them with all his followers. These entered the bazars and plundered them and all the houses, together with the magazines of the merchants. They frightened the women and children, killing some and taking others for slaves. They plundered all the goods of the merchants and the property of the British subjects, and, in fact, everything they could get hold of. The Bahrein people have nothing left, and have no Ruler to look after them. Should one of the above Chiefs become Ruler, he will oppress and worry the people; as these have now no Chief, we beg from the great Government, if it seems proper, to receive the Island of Bahrein and its people under the protection and as its subjects, and that the island may be considered as part of the Government possessions and the inhabitants as British subjects residing in peace and security under the Government protection. Colonel Pelly to manage our affairs and get us back what has been plundered. This is our humble petition.

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Colonel Pelly's visit to Riad about the Wahhabee attack on Sohar.

No. 71. From C. GONNE, Esq., Secretary to Government of Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,—No. 20, dated the 6th February 1866.

In reply to your telegram dated the 30th ultimo, I am directed to refer you to my letter of the 3rd June last, No. 93, with which a copy of a Report* by the Resident in the Persian Gulf, relative to the Wahhabee Territory, was submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy in Council.

* No. 11, dated the 14th February 1865, with accompaniment.

2. A spare copy of this Report is herewith forwarded. No other Report on the subject of that Officer's visit to the Wahhabee capital has yet been received by this Government.

No. 72. From LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LEWIS PELLY, Resident, Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to Government of Bombay,—No. 11, dated Camp en route to Riad, the 14th February 1865.

I HAVE the honour to continue the subject of my letter of the 21st ultimo relative to the differences between the Sultan of Muscat and the Wahhabees.

2. Information subsequently collected tends to confirm the facts of the case as then submitted. The Sultan now seems to have obtained peace by buying off the interference of the Wahhabee Deputy at Bereymah. But forbearance thus purchased is a confession of weakness, and may encourage the plundering tribes on His Highness's frontier to renewed incursions.

3. Government instruct me to let His Highness "clearly understand that the British Government has no intention of interfering in the differences between the Powers on the shores of the Persian Gulf by aiding one party to coerce the other." Before representing this instruction to the Sultan, I would respectfully submit to Government whether His Highness might consider it as in some degree deviating from the spirit of the second Article of the Muscat Treaty, which declares that the friend of the one Government is to be the friend of the other, and in like manner the enemy of this is to be the enemy of that.

No. 3933, of 26th December 1864.

4. It might be possible to annul that Treaty, as the Sultan would probably be unable to fulfil his obligations under its 7th Article. But His Excellency in Council would, perhaps, hesitate to adopt this course towards an old ally, whose power we have essentially weakened by dividing it into two separate States under an arbitrament which we voluntarily dictated.

5. There is another course open. The Wahhabees are alleged tributaries of the Porte. A letter based on the recent complaint of the Sultan, might be addressed by Government to the Ambassador at Constantinople stating the character of our Treaty relations with Muscat, and requesting His Excellency's good offices in moving the Government of the Porte to restrain their dependants in the Wahhabee Territories from interfering with the Sultan of Muscat, which it concerns us should remain independent under the terms of our arbitration.

6. On the whole, as peace has been restored between Muscat and the Wahhabees, Government may prefer to allow the matter to lie dormant for the moment. It is possible that my visit to the Wahhabee capital may tend to lessen the "noxious influence" of the Wahhabee Authorities, and so facilitate any friendly offices Government may deem fit to afford on any future complaint of the Sultan of Muscat. After returning from the Wahhabee country, I shall hope to find an early opportunity for a friendly conversation with the

Colonel Pelly's visit to Riad about the Wahhabee attack on Sohar.

Sultan and his Vizier in accordance with the general spirit of the Government instruction.

7. I append an outline of Arabia, showing the positions of the Wahhabee Power and of the minor Chieftains friendly to it; also the position of the Muscat Sultanate and of the minor Chieftains friendly to it. Government will readily observe how interlaced these interests are.

8. A memorandum submitted by this opportunity to Government and the Royal Geographical Society on various questions mooted relative to the Wahhabee Territory contains some remarks which His Excellency in Council might possibly wish to glance at his leisure in connection with the subject of my present letter.

Dated 14th February 1865.

Note on certain questions relative to the interior of Arabia, discussed before the Royal Geographical Society on the 22nd February and 14th March 1864, and published in their issue of 28th April 1864.

THE coast line between Kateef and Koweit is loosely called Adan. Strictly speaking, Adan applies to a strip of rising ground a few miles to the southward of Koweit, and which is known to the native sailors as Hejaj-al-bent from its supposed resemblance to the curve of a girl's eyebrow.

Proceeding inland you come on a belt of country called Hajar or Summan, the term Hajar being applied to sandstone, or friable stone generally, and Summan to a tract strewn with boulders or hard stones: this tract is of a stony, pebbly character. It may have an average breadth of two days' journey; it has a general direction between north-west and north and south-east and south; it loses itself in the great desert, called Rob-al-khali, on its southern extremity, and in the great uninhabited tract lying to the west of the Euphrates, on its northern extremity.

Leaving the Summan and still proceeding inland you come on a second and parallel belt known as the Dehna or Nafûd. This tract also has an average breadth of two days' journey, and, like the Summan, merges at its south-eastern and north-western extremities in the two deserts above alluded to. This belt is formed of a succession of mounds or waves of sand popularly stated to be seven in number, Dehna being a name given to a tract composed of sandy mounds, and Nafûds implying a succession of such mounds.

Leaving the Dehna you come again on a tract of various breadth lying between the Dehna and the highlands forming Nejed Proper. This tract is known under different names at different points; for instance, at its narrowest part, being that immediately beneath the Towaij hills, it is called Sedair; further south, that is, between the Mahmal District and the Dehna, it seems to have no distinctive name, but is sometimes called Sedair and sometimes Mahmal. Still further south, that is, between the Dehna and Aaredh, it is called Orma.

The hill line immediately within the above-mentioned tract forms the eastern highlands of Nejed Proper. This hill line runs in a general direction of north, a little west and south, a little east. At its northern point is Zolfy, and from Zolfy down to the village of Owdeh the range is known as Al-Towaij. This is the highest portion of the eastern highlands of Nejed. Below Owdeh there is a break in the range stretching from one to two days' journey, namely, from the village of Tadij to the old town of Sedoos. The plateau formed by this break is called Mahmal. From Sedoos in a southerly direction the country again rises, and so reaches Riad, distant one long day's journey, through the villages of Ayneh, Jebeeleh, and the old Wahhabee capital, Dereyeyah. These highlands to the southward of Sedoos are known (as above stated) as Al-Aaredh. The Wady Hanifeh cleaves the Aaredh from Ayneh through Dereyeyah (which was situated half on one side of the valley