

1958

Debaye

The Shaikh of **Debaye** in the early part of the year 1843, at the time when contentions were raging between the **Joasmee** and **Aboothabee** Chiefs after observing a strict neutrality for a considerable period, suddenly entered into an alliance with the latter and offered his services as a mediator between the two belligerents.

This proceedings we are told by Captain Kemball, gave umbrage to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who but ill concealed his disapprobation, indeed the aversion of the Chiefs other² must have been reciprocal for at one moment we find Shaikh Mukhtoom of **Debaye** acting mediator, and presently we observe him after a peace has been effected between the two rival Chieftains instigating the ¹one his ally to break the peace by foraying the territories of the other his enemy. The subjects of either party, too, those of the **Joasmee** as well as of **Debaie** began to show their feelings of enmity by a course of petty aggressions which, however, it must be allowed, do not seem to have been committed with the knowledge or consent of either of the Chiefs.

Mahomed bin Majid, a subject of Sultan bin Suggur having siezed² a native of Chaab from a **Debaie** Boat, the people of the latter tribe not choosing to await

¹ Sheikh Khaleefa Chief of Aboothabee and Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur of Joasmee side supra.

² August 1844

1958

1959

reparation that they know won't be and which mutually was afforded them by the Resident, took upon themselves to effect reprisals and to board and plunder a **Kuyyarah** belonging to Abdullah bin Butye of **Shargah**. This act was not in any way ...(?) A need by Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butye--- far from it-- the inflicted punishment upon his offending subjects caused whatever had been taken from Shaikh Sultan's people to be restored unto them and went so far as if his own free will to bind over the delinquents to keep the peace by making them lodge in the hands of the British Agent them of 100 crowns as security for their future good behaviour-- a striking proof this of the well working of the system in operation for the suppression of Piracy -- for it was Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butye who in former years gave as much if not more trouble to the British representative than any one of the maritime Chiefs by the open manner in which he encouraged a spirit of maritime irregularity.

From the commencement of 1845 to the close of the ensuing year the **Jaosmee** and **Aboothabee** Chiefs did all in their power to reduce the Shaikh of Debaie to a state of submission. Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butye and his staunch and faithful ally the **Chief of Amulgavine** proved however more than a match for their formidable adversaries-- they successfully defended themselves against all the attacks, both foul and fair, that were made upon their territories and at the close of 1846 when a last and tremendous attack was about to be directed on the Fort of **Debaie** did a quarrel

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Rise between the two allied Chiefs either of whom suddenly shifting his policy, preferred overtures of peace to the common foe Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butye³ who entered into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, but refused the advances of Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon.

A vacillating Trio the above it must be confessed-- when we commenced our narrative the **Beni Yas** and **Jaosmee Chiefs** were in the thick of contentions-- then came the Shaikh of Debaie and by joining the former offended the latter -- presently the **Beni Yas** and **Jaosmee** entered into an alliance, offensive and defensive, and attacked the Shaikh of Debaie, and now we find the **Debaie** and **Jaosmee** acting in concert and the **Beni Yas** at enmity with either.

Lasting and durable alliances these-- likely to heighten the feeling of trust and dependence to be place upon Treaties contracted in future. The last arrangement, however, though scarcely more than momental in the outset, remained unbroken until the month of July 1848 when a truly close and intimate alliance was entered into between the two⁴ for the purpose of opposing the plans of aggrandizement which the now all powerful Chief of the Beni Yas seemed to entertain in the direction of their respective territories.

³ 1847

⁴ Debaie and Jaosmee vide preceding page line 5

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Shaikh Makhtoom fearing an attack upon Debaie found it to his interest to remain in league with Shaikh Sultan bins Suggur, who on his side, too trembled for the safety of his possessions on **the Batinah Coast**. It was clearly, therefore, fear and apprehension alone that drove the pair to to unite and grow as it were, into one, for much jealousy had been of late displayed by either-- and we were rather prepared to find the equally hasty and suspicious Chiefs aiming blows at each other than aiming at the overthrow of another. They combined, however, and strove in union well together. We are somewhat amazed at the perfect harmony that existed between them-- so easily did they fall into each other's ways and views, so obliging and accommodating the one to the other. We could have wished it were otherwise. We were ready to see the Jaosmee do and propose all manner of nakedness. We knew he was the most artful and deceitful of mortals-- we knew he was devoid of principle-- we perceive he was too deeply sunk in the pits of infancy to hope for recovery-- but from Shaikh Makhtoom we looked for better things. We knew he was feeble and inconstant-- we knew he was jealous-- we did not know he was mean. However facile, however pliant his nature we did not expect he would stoop to deceit-- he did so however-- too weak to refuse his ally, or too much afraid, perhaps, of his powerful adversary to keep his honesty he lent himself to acts of duplicity that must leave a stain on his name for ever. We possess, however, one redeeming feature in his character--

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One saving clause if so we may term it-- He does not appear in any simple instance during his present alliance to have originated nay thing base-- He followed the Leader, but did not take the Lead. He took part in deceit but did not propose deceit-- not it must in justice be said tho' I fear it forms but a poor apology were his deeds of perfidy many and countless like those of Shaikh Sultan's-- His were few and far between-- one noble specimen will be found in the sketch of the **Joasmee Tribe** wherein I have fully described the ruse adopted by Shaikh Sultan and participated in by Shaikh Makhtoom, for the purpose of leading astray the unsuspecting Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon.

The two Chiefs were shortly joined by **the Shaikh of Ejmaun** and when the **Wahabee forces** had been shamefully defeated and the Beni Yas had reached the zenith of his power, did the three espouse the cause of the fallen Saud bin Mootluk and refrain to Brymee for the purpose of ejecting there from Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon. A number of skirmishes followed in the immediate vicinity of the Forts but owing to the arrival of a mediator and the acceptance of Peace by the Belligerent parties⁵ the whole of the Chiefs returned to their seats and hostilities ceased.

Shaikh Makhtoom still kept up a friendly intercourse with the **Joasmee**, and the pair of them especially the former, strongly advised⁶ **Ameer Fysul** to

⁵ February 1849

⁶ November 1849

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rebuild the tower and **Fort of Adeed** and to replace therein the people of the Gubeysat Tribe. Their intrigues, however, did not produce the desired effect. The Tribe in question thought fit, during the absence of Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon at Shinas and Muscat to secede from **Aboothabee** and repair to the **Guttur Coast**-- a step which so incensed the Beni Yas Chief that he resorted to measures of the greatest severity to bring the offenders to punishment--measures un-tempered with mercy of honesty that eventually reduced the power and resources of the Tribe to a state bordering on nothingness.

To relate the part that was taken by the **Debaie** Chief in the Muscat Brymee and Sohar complications will not detain us long.

Shaikh Makhtoom cordially hated the Beni Yas Chief and was ever striving to reduce and weaken his power -- and when the **Joasmee** summoned the rest of the tribes to unite with himself and proceed to the aid of the Chief of Sohar nothing would have tempted the **Debaie** Shaikh to declare himself one of the league had he not thought an attack upon Shaikh Sa'eed was sure to be made during the course of operations.⁷ This and this alone prompted him to equip a body of troops and repair to **Zeyt** to meet the rest of the Chiefs⁸; but when he found Shaikh Sultan Shaikh Sultan caring for the interests of none but himself, when he

⁷ 1850

⁸ Letter from British Agent at Shargah dt. April 10th 1850

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saw him bent on a move in the direction of Batinah, he was no longer eager for strife. He reluctantly followed as far as Shinas⁹ and after the reduction of the peace returned to his seat at Debaie.

Early in the ensuing year we gather from the tense (?) of a conversation held by the Resident with Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butye on the 30th day of January that the Debaie Chief had entered into terms of friendship and amity with Shaikh **Mahomed bin Khaleefa**, and in consequence thereof had written to **Ameer Fysul** strongly dissuading him from the scheme of forming a settlement at Tihar ul Adeed which led the **Wahabee** to express his surprise and astonishment at finding the very Chief who proposed the plan and urged its immediate fulfillment suddenly thwarting and opposing the project.

This intrigue was quickly followed by another.

In the month of March¹⁰ arrived at **Debaie** on his way to Aboothabee, one Moobaruck bin Suroor, the Chief of the **Monasir** with letters from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon-- negotiations, it would seem, had for some time past been carried on by the Chiefs. I have mentioned, and the letters now in the possession of Moobaruck were nothing more or less than the acceptance

⁹ No. 58 of 1850 from Com. Porter to Coll. Hennell, dt. Aug. 25, 1850

¹⁰ March 1851

1964

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Of offers that had been made to the **Joasmee** by the **Beni Yas Chief**.

The envoy had scarcely placed foot on the soil of Debaie ere Shaikh Makhtoom became aware of the Important Documents he held in his hands-- Moobaruk was seized and thrown into confinement, a plain and distinct intimation was sent to Shaikh Sultan that if he wished to keep on good terms with the **Debaie Chief**, then must he neither permit the letters or the envoy to go to Aboothabee.

Shaikh Sultan unwilling to break with Shaikh Makhtoom, but more unwilling to remain at fond with Shaikh Sa'eed did not boldly and manfully declare his determination to make peace with the Beni Yas whether Makhtoom wished it or no, but resorted to effect his object to his usual mode of duplicity.

He feigned compliance with the desires of the Debaie Chief by dispatching his secretary Mahomed bin Alee Booshelaybee¹¹ to bring back the letters he had sent, and, so soon as he returned to **Shargah**, did he forward the identical documents in charge of a man of the **Aboo Heyle** straight to Shaikh Sa'eed at **Aboothabee**.

The usual of the affair was this. Peace was concluded between the **Joasmee** and **Beni Yas Chiefs** and Shaikh Makhtoom fearful for himself drew more closely to the Wahabee.

The time was now at hand for the arrival of H. H. the **Imam** from his possessions at Zanzibar on the

¹¹ British Agent at Shargah's report March 20th 1851

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African Coast. He had long talked of repairing to **Muscat** for the purpose of adjusting and avenging the quarrel that had been so unhappily raging between his son and the **Sohar Chief**.

Shaikh Makhtoom enraged with the **Imam** for the alliance he had lately contracted, and thinking the moment favorable for cultivating the friendship of the **Muscat** authorities defended his brother in a friendly mission to H.C. Syed Saweynee, and eventually when H.H. arrived and commenced operations against the **Sohar Chief**, did he afford him active support and remain in union until the spring of the succeeding year when, while on his way from **Muscat** to the **Island of Kishm**, he was seized with an attack of smallpox which carried him off before he reached the end of his journey.

Having in the earlier part of our narrative somewhat severely censured the conduct of the 'deceased Chief' it is but right that we should likewise adduce whatever we know in favour of his character.

There was such of good in Shaikh Makhtoom-- He was a Chief of undoubted bravery and ability-- He was also, so far as we are able to judge, as much esteemed and beloved by the people of his tribe as any one of the maritime Chiefs, and as regards the fulfillment of engagements with the British Government, I can not be better, I think, than quote the opinion expressed by Captain

1966

1967

(270)

Kemball in one of his letters to Government regarding him.¹²

"Shaikh Makhtoom", he tells us "tho' manifesting on his first establishment at Debaie a refractory spirit which led to the adoption of coercive measures towards him had at least for the past ten years been distinguished among the Chiefs of the Coast for the general observance of his engagements and apprehending clearly the policy of the British Government has conducive to the advancement and prosperity of the Arab States, for the earnestness of his endeavors in support of its arrangements to preserve the maritime tranquility of the Gulf.

Shaikh Makhtoom was succeeded by his brother Shaikh Sa'eed bin Butye to the Chiefship.

Shortly after resuming the reins of Government Shaikh Sa'eed bin Butye¹³ repaired to Muscat on a visit to H.H. Syed Sa'eed-- His departure so early a season before he was firmly seated in his new position was scarcely prudent or wise, for he must have been well aware that there were aspirants to the Chiefship he held, eagerly seeking an opportunity to take unto themselves what they looked upon as their hereditary right. We find accordingly that Sa'eed bin Butye had barely left his seat ere the sons of the late Makhtoom, by name Sohail and Husher with their maternal uncle Majid bin Dulnouonj (?) and some of the Al

¹² No. 25 of 1852 from Captain A.B. Kemball Acting Resident to A. Malet Esquire
Chief Secretary to Govt. dated April 26th 1852

¹³ October 2nd 1852

1967

1968

Boo Tilasa surprised the Fort of Debaie¹⁴ whose garrison acted treacherously and had an understanding with them, and they took the Fort seizing the Guardian appointed by Sa'eed bin Butye, by name Sa'eed bin Rashid, the maternal uncle of Makhtoom who was asleep and whom they place in confinement together with another person named Khaleefa bin Sa'eed." Sa'eed bin Rashid did not remain in captivity long. He was set at liberty and permitted to assume the title of Chief, but not to resume command of the Forts, which continued in the hands of Sohail and Husher. By no means content with the mere nominal power that thus reverted to himself, Sa'eed bin Rashid resolved to revert to treachery for the purpose of expelling Makhtoom's sons from Debaie. The measures he adopted were crowned with success. Sohail and Husher were compelled to quit the place, and to flee for protection to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur.

Such was the posture of affairs when Sa'eed bin Butye returned to his seat at **Debaie**. He perceived at a glance the enormity of the evil existing. He saw how much it was likely to increase now the plotting **Joasmee** had mixed himself up in the quarrel-- nor was he mistaken--Shaikh Sultan was busy intriguing in every manner and shape-- he had already induced one -- Sa'eed bin Maanaul Moheyree, by tempting offers in gold, to quit Debaie with his tribe and to go and settle at **Shargah**-- and it is difficult to say how matters would have ended, had not Sa'eed bin Butye made advances to Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon that resulted in an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two Chiefs,

¹⁴ Extract from a letter from British Agent at Shargah dated Oct. 13th 1852

1968

1969

who were likewise joined by the **Shaikh of Amulgavine** , thereby forming a coalition too strong for the **Joasmee** to dream of opposing it.

Nothing of importance connected with this tribe occurred from this period until the spring of 1853, when Captain Kemball proceeded on a tour of the Gulf for the purpose of arranging matters connected with the Perpetual Treaty of Peace to be entered into by the maritime Chiefs. It is not unworthy of notice that Shaikh Sa'eed bin Butye ¹⁵ alone of their number failed to wait upon Abdullah bin Fysul on the occasion of his arrival at **Brymee** with a Nedjdee Force-- he only renowned at his Port¹⁶-- and from the time of a conversation held by him with the Resident on the Honourable Company's sloop of war "Clive" off the Port of Shargah may¹⁷ be gathered soon extremely averse he was or effected to be to the presence of a Wahabee Force in the Province of **Oman**.

One more remark would I make ere on bringing this sketch to a close from the promptitude displayed by Shaikh Sa'eed bin Butye in repressing maritime irregularities, whomsoever committed by his dependents, and from the readiness he showed to subscribe to the new Treaty of Peace, it is plain that he was anxious to cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the British Govt¹⁸. in the

¹⁶ Sa'eed bin Butye deputed his maternal uncle to Brymee in his stead vide same letter as above.

¹⁷ May 5th /53 vide Captain Kemball's letter to Govt. No. 35 of 1853 copied by ...

¹⁸ for one proof thereof vide same letter as above 35 of /53

1969

1970

same degree as had been done by Shaikh Makhtoom, his brother before him.

True sketch

Signed by H.F. Disbrowe Assistant
Resident Persian Gulf.

1970

(1971)

Ejmaun

1844

Taking up the history of this tribe, in continuation of Captain Kemball's Historical Sketches, the first occurrence worthy of notice is that of a collision between two Boats on the Pearl Bank, the one belonging to *Shargah* the other to *Ejmaun*. In this case the people of *Joasmee* were decidedly the aggressors.

"One *Esai bin Qassim*, an inhabitant of *Shargah*" I quote the words of the British Agent " with a number of Pearl Boats¹, belonging to that tribe were anchored among those pertaining to other tribes. By chance the *Buggarah* of one *Syf*, a Native of *Ejmaun*, was engaged in the Pearl Fishery near that of above mentioned *Esai bin Qassim*, when a misunderstanding took place, between them on the subject of the cables of their anchors. It was at first confined to talking and abuse, but *Esai bin Qassim* shortly after fired a matchlock at the *Ejmaun* then boarded her, thrust a spear into the body of one of the crew and struck another three blow on the head with an iron mace².

The *Ejmaun* people did not resort to arms but flung themselves into the sea and were eventually picked up by Pearl Divers of their own tribe and conveyed home on their Boats.

This matter when it came to the ears of the Resident, was at once taken up by the officer who wrote to *Shaikh Abdool Azeez*, asking him whether he wished the case to be settled according to the

¹ 1844

² Letter from British Agent January 1845

(1972)

Mohammedan Law, or would prefer its being treated by the British Authorities as one of violation of Maritime Truce.

The reply of the Ejmaun Chief leaving the adjustment of the affair in the hands of the Resident

Demands were immediately made upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur for redress in the shape of Two hundred dollars which sum Esai bin Qassim was to be compelled to disburse as compensation to the wounded Ejmaunee.

The vessels of war were dispatched to Rasul Khymah and Shargah to support the requisition and a communication was addressed to the Chief of Joasmee acquainting him with the object of their visit

December 1844

No hesitation was exhibited by Shaikh Sultan to comply with the demand preferred against him. On the contrary he hastened to furnish an order for the amount required at the hands of his lawless subjects and brought the matter to a peaceable settlement.

Dec.5, 1844 About this time also took place an affair reflecting the greatest credit upon the character of the Chief of this Tribe,

Two vessels having embarked a quantity of rice of Lingah and proceeded over to Shargah but being caught in a storm, and unable to make the Part, in consequence they strove to enter the Backwater leading into Ejmaun Harbour.

One vessel foundered in making the attempt, the other however after getting rid of 100 moras of her cargo succeeded in reaching the Inner Harbour.

(1973)

Shaikh Abdool Azeez hearing what had occurred, hastened down to the beach accompanied by his brother and there did the pair of them drawing ¹their savors swear a solemn oath that they would cut? down the first man who dared to approach the Boat or lay hands on the Rice." After a while the owners of the cargo apprised of what had befallen their vessels, came to Ejmaun where they remained a period of six days drying their rice and eventually left for Shargah without having lost a grain of their property.

So marked was the conduct of Shaikh Abdool Azeez so far as moved from the usual spirit of mischief displayed by the Chiefs in cases of like temptation that the British Government thought at right to notify their approval of his behaviour by a special note of thanks. Major Hennell therefore was requested to intiss (?) to us to the Ejmaun Chief

" How highly the Government he represented appreciated his praiseworthy exertions and conduct."³

In the early part of the ensuing year⁴ Shaikh Abdool Azeez entered into an alliance with the Chiefs of Debai and Amulgavine for the purpose of resisting and repelling the combined attacks of their common foes⁵ Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahoon. He scarcely however deserves the name of an ally for in lieu of remaining staunch and firm to the cause he had espoused and to which, moreover, it was his especial interest to adhere, he was ever inconstant and changeable.

³. Letter 2051 of 45 from Chief Secretary to Government to Resident P.G.

⁴. 1946

⁵. JOASMEE Chief and Beni Yas Chief

(1974)

We find him on one occasion permitting him to be detached from the side of Shaikh Makhtoom⁶. And acknowledging his subservience to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur merely it was supposed to enable him to proceed to the fishery. Again we are told by Major Hennell, some three months later in the self-same year that the Chiefs of Debai, Ejmaun and Amulgauvine⁷ one and all, loudly complained of the Jaosmee's unfriendly proceedings in preventing intercourse between their respective subjects. And lastly in a letter⁸ from the same office bearing date the 15th of December/ 46 we read that the Shaikh of Ejmaun had found himself pressed by the adherents of the Jaosmee on either sides of his Port that he had been compelled to withdraw from his alliances with the Chiefs of Amulgauvine and Debai and place himself under the protection of his former enemy Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, from which it would seem that he accommodated himself entirely to the existing state of circumstances and had no hesitation in declaring for this party or that party according as he thought would be more beneficial to his personal interests.

There is nothing of importance⁹ to relate until the summer of the year 1848 when after the Brymee Fort had succumbed to the prowess of the Confederate Chiefs of Aboothabee and Sohar, the Jaosmee and Debai Chiefs trembling for the integrity of their respective possessions entered into a close and strict alliance and proposed to the Shaikh of Ejmaun

⁶. 1846 Debai Chief Letter from Moolla Hoossein to Resident May 46

⁷. No. 81 / August 46 to Chief Secretary to Govt. Bombay

⁸. No. 127 of 1846 to Chief Secretary to Govt. Bombay

⁹. 1848

1974

(1975)

and Amulgauvine that they also should join the league against the Beni Yas Ruler. Either however declined the invitation received and refused to take part in the nefarious machinations of the Jaosmee vs. his complying associate Debai.

In the month of September¹⁰. Of the same year occurred a serious conflict between the people of Ejmaun and those of Himreeah (?)

A feud it would seem had long existed between the inhabitants of the two places and altho' for some time past it had lain, apparently, dormant, it was all of a sudden revived and hostilities were resorted to with more than their usual ferocity. The circumstances attending the renewal of strife were these:

On the 18th of September Syf bin Abdullah dying, the people elected in his stead one of their elders Abdullah bin Abdul Suteef (?). Whether the step gave umbrage to Shaikh Abdool Azeez or whether he thought a favorable moment for recourse to coercion had arrived I know not. By whatever feeling he was activated

However he set out with a force of no less 400 followers for the purpose of inflicting chastisement upon the people of Himruah.

¹⁰. Sept. 1848

(1976)

His brother Hamud bin Rashid also accompanied the expedition-- one half of his army did he past on the banks of the Khari and with the rest did he proceed to Himreah direct. The foe was well prepared to receive him. They left a small body of troops to defend their town and with a party some 120 in number hastened to meet the invader. The Detachment encountered and notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the Ejmaunees, the people of Himreah proved quickly victorious. The former perceiving the fall of Abdul Azeez, their Chief, and also that of Hamud bin Rashid, his brother, was wounded, finding themselves deprived of a Leader, were seized with a panic and fled from the field in the greatest disorder.

The Hinruahites followed close in pursuit until they reached the very walls of the Town of Ejmaun whence after killing and wounding a considerable number they retraced their steps to Him reach. Such was the result of the conflict. As to casualties the Ejmaunees besides their Chief suffered a loss of twenty-six killed and twenty men wounded. On the side of Himreeah the Chief and five others were killed on the spot and so many as twenty-two placed " hois de combat."

Hamud bin Rashid was elected Chief of Ejmaun and the son of Syf bin Abdoolah head of Himueerah.

Hostilities continued for a length of time, neither Chief permitting his subjects to proceed to the Pearl Fishery, the season for which had now arrived, until Abdullah bin Rashid, at the invitation of the Chief of Heera repaired nic (?) person to Ejmaun and mediated a peace between the contending parties.

Hamud bin Rashid had scarcely been Chief a couple of months ere he espoused the cause of the defeated Wahabee and joined the league against Shaikh Saeed at Brymee. What part, if any, he took in the skirmishes that were fought with the Chief of Beni Yas does not appear. Of his subsequent proceedings no mention is made. We simply gather from a letter, addressed to Major Hennell on the 8th of December '48, that he set out on the 4th of the month with the Nedjdees, Joasmees, and Boo

(1977)

Telasa to attack the holders of Brymee. A general peace was concluded in February of the ensuing year¹¹ in the terms of which Hamud bin Rashid was of course included.

In the Spring of 1850 when the Joasmee repaired with his allies to Sohar and the Batinah Coast for the purpose of assisting Syed Ges, repelling Shaikh Saeed and contending with Syed Saweynee, Shaikh Hamud bin Rashid proceeded to Zeyt¹² to join Shaikh Sultan with a detachment of two hundred men. No particular account is given of the Proceedings of Hamud bin Rashid beyond the simple fact of the side he espoused and Syed Ges and Shaikh Sultan¹³ after the fall of Shinas and the departure of the Shaikhs of Debaie and Amulgauvine from the seat of war being ever styled the allied Chiefs, it is to be inferred therefrom that the part he took in the conflict, if indeed he took any, was scarcely more than nominal.

Not our single matter of interest remains to be told affecting this Tribe, further than a simple mention of the Treaty for Perpetual Peace at sea, entered into by the maritime Chiefs of the Arabian Coast until the conditions of which Shaikh Hamud bin Rashid exhibited the greatest readiness to subscribe in the month of May 1853.¹⁴

True Sketch

Signed by H.F. Disbrowe

Asstt. Resident Persian Gulf.

¹¹ . February 1849

¹² . Letter from Molla Hossein 15th April 1850

¹³ May 10th 1850

¹⁴ 1853.

(1978)

Office No. 301

No. 123 of 1854

From H.L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to the Govt. of Bombay
To:

G.F. Edmonstone Esquire
Secretary to the Govt. of India
The Foreign Department, Fort William

Dated 14th December 1854

Secret Department

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. 13 dated the 7 Ultimo regarding the hostile relations between Persia and Muscat, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to enclose for submission to the Most Noble the Governor General of India in Council, copy of a communication and of its enclosures, from the Resident in The Persian Gulf No. (?) dated the 2nd October last.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant

Sd. Secretary to Govt.

Bombay Castle

14th December 1854

1978

(1979)

No. 10-A of 1854

Political Department

From: Captain A.B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To:

H.L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to the Govt. in the Political Department
Bombay
On board of HC "Clive"
Bassidore Roads

26th September 1854

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for the information of Govt. copy of a communication to my address from H.H. the Imam of Muscat announcing the success of his measures for the recovery of Bunder Abbas and of those for the settlement of the disturbed districts of Sohar on the coast of Batinah. This communication, though dated the 3rd Instant, only reached me yesterday. In reply, it is my intention to express in general terms, my satisfaction at any occurrence tending to promote the real interests of His Highness.

I have the honour to be
Signed A.B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf from

On board of H.C's' "Clive"
Bussadore Roads
26th September 1854

(1980)

Translation

From:

His Highness Syed Saeed,
Imam of Muscat.

To:

Captain A.B. Kemball,
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Dated 9th Zilhijjah 1270

5th September 1854

Received 25th September 1854

A.C. I beg to acquaint you that in the end of the month Shawwal I left Muscat for the districts of Sohar for the purpose of chastising those who had betrayed a leaning towards the people of the west Wahabees during my absence those deserving punishment I punished and those wanting forgiveness I forgave. Now, therefore all are submissive and obedient.

Next I deputed my son Soweeynee and with him 1500 men to attack Bunder Abbas Minas and those parts. By the grace of God on their reaching Bunder Abbas Khan and the Sirbaz and others with him to the number of about 1500 men fled and were dispersed and this occurred on the self-same night that the force arrived. They evacuated the place and it was occupied by my troops. The expedition then went to Minas and on its approach the garrison consisting of the people of Lar took to flight.

(1981)

The Persians in the Fort were 700 strong. I thank God for the success of my affairs and have much pleasure in communicating the same to you.

True Translation

Signed: A.B. Kemball

Resident Persian Gulf

True Copy

Signed A.B. Kemball

Resident Persian Gulf

True copies

Signed Secretary to Govt.

(1982)

Translation

From: His Highness Syed Saeed, Imam of Muscat
To: Captain Kemball, Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Dated: 12th Zilhijjah 1270/ 6th September 1854

A.C. Your letter has reached me and I have understood its contents. I was indeed greatly rejoiced at the receipt of your answer, which was most gratifying to me and such, as I expected at your hands. You tell me you will represent the matter to H.E. the Envoy in the hope that it may lead to reconciliation between me and Tehran (?) I should indeed be very thankful that our relations were restored upon the terms on which they formerly existed so far from opposing. I sincerely desire an accommodation more especially if effected through your mediation but if this be not agreeable to them the Persians then ... (?) things take their course as God may determine. What I know is that the Arabs can inflict more injuries upon the Persians than can the Persians upon the Arabs and of this I conceive they are well aware. I pray God to ordain for us and for them whatever is most beneficial to both.

True translation

Signed: A.B. Kemball Resident P.G.

(1983)

Office No. 343

Cons. No. 73 of 1854

From: Lieutenant H.F. Disbrowe
Assistant Resident Persian Gulf
Incharge Local Duties at Bushire

To: H. L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to Govt. Bombay
Residency in the Persian Gulf

Political Department

Bushire 6th Oct. 1854

Sir, I have the honour to forward for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the accompanying copy of a letter No. 322 dated 20th Ultimo addressed by me to Her Majesty's Charge d' Affaires at the Court of Persia.

I have the honour to be

Signed H.F. Disbrowe Assistant Resident P.G.
Incharge Local duties Bushire

1983

(1984)

Office No. 343 Cons. No.73 of 1854
From: Lieutenant H.F. Disbrowe
Assistant Resident
Persian Gulf Incharge Local duties at Bushire
To:

H.L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to the Govt. Bombay
Residency in the Persian Gulf
Political Deptt. Bushire 6th Oct. 1854

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for the information
of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the
accompanying copy of a letter No. 322 dated the 20th
Ultimo addressed by me to Her Majesty's Charge d' Affaires
at the Court of Persia.

I have the honour to be etc.

Signed; H.F. Disbrowe
Assistant Resident P.G.

(1855)

Memo:

Distance between Kurrachee and Muscat - 462 Miles

■ " --Muscat round the Quoins to Bussadore - (direct from Quoins $271\frac{1}{2}$ miles usual pilot course 281 miles.

■ " -- Bussadore safe course to Bushire is 335 miles

■ " --Bushire via Shout at Arab to Bussorah is 210 miles

Total = 1295 miles

- The prevailing winds in the Gulf of Persia are NW and SE squalls (and sometimes very heavy ones) occur from NW in every month of the year.
- In the winter months, gales from NW as well as from SE often occur.
- From June to September the weather is mild and squalls less frequent.
- Squalls from NW sometimes occur at the full or change of moon but pass over without much severity. The weather in these months is intensely hot.

Signed G. G. Wellesley

Commander in Chief I. N.

Office of the Commander

in Chief I. N.

Bombay 7th April 1859

True copies

Secretary to Government

(1986)

Office No. 8

No. 4 of 1855

From: H.L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to Govt. Bombay

To: The Secretary of the Govt. of India
In the Foreign Department, Fort William

Dated 5th January 1855

Secret Department

Sir,

As connected with enclosure No. 92, in the letter from the Government the address of the Secretary with the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, dated the 26th September No. 1509 of 1854 relative to affairs at *Bahrein*, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to transmit to you for submission to the Most Noble the Governor General of India in Council, copy of a communication from the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated the 3rd October last No. 19 of 1854.

I have the honour to be,

1. Sir,

Your Most Obedient Servant

Bombay Castle
5th January 1855

Signed: Secretary Govt. Bombay

1986

(1987)

No. 11(a) of 1854

From,

Captain A. B. Kemball

Resident in the PG

To

H. L. Anderson Esquire

Secretary to Government in the Political Dept. Bombay

H. C. S. 'Clive'

Bassudore Roads

2nd October 1854

Political Dept.

Sir,

Adverting to my letter No. 4(a) of sixth ultimo, I have more the honour to enclose for the information of government, copy of a further dispatch addressed by me to H. M.'s charge d' affaires at the Teheran communicating the rejection by the Imam of Muscat of the proposal made to him to depute an envoy to Teheran for the purpose of discussing his grievances with the Persian Government and communicating the reasons which have determined me to refrain for the present from pressing the subject upon H. M.

I have the honour to be
Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf

1987

(1988)

The Government of Bombay forward copies of three dispatches from Captain Kemball, the resident in the PG who in reporting the settlement under the maritime treaty which exists between us and certain chiefs along the PG of a case on which contrary to the provisions of the dependables of the chief of Shargah and of the chief of Bahrein had plundered each other's boats at sea. Submits for favorable considerations the objections, which the chief of Bahrein has raised against being again held responsible for the acts of those of his dependents in whom he has had to answer on this occasion, namely the people of Smaymeh and the other tribes being on the Guttur Coast. The chief urges that if he were to attempt to enforce the responsibility of these tribes in such a case as the present one, they would at once renounce allegiance to him arrange themselves under the sovereignty of his enemies Ben Saad therefore is most desirous that when these tribes break the treaty the resident should undertake their punishment himself. Capt. Kemball states that the chief's fears are well founded and that it would be against our interest if any such result came to fore. He therefore would comply with his requests the Bombay Government and of Bahrein that in such a case Capt. Kemball should be authorised to use his own dissent. Capt. Kemball negotiated the maritime treaty and has a thorough knowledge of our interests in the Gulf. H. H. on six may therefore be disposed to allow him to relax the operation of the treaty in the manner proposed when he may see occasion to do so.

1988

(1989)

Translation

From His Highness Syud Saeed Imam of Muscat

To

Captain A. B. Kemball

Resident in the PG

Dated 22nd Zilhijjah 1270

14th September 1854

A. C.

I had the honour to receive on the 19th/13th instant your letter dated 12th/6th Idem and understood the details therein communicated.

Touching the matter at issues between myself and the Persian Government and your proposal to mediate between us with a view to an accommodation should indeed be obliged thereby provided they accorded to the stipulations formerly enforce in the time of Mohammed Shah when I paid annually 6000 tumans and H. M remitted 2000 tumans. If the Shah consent to this I likewise agree to it and please God would do nothing opposed to an arrangement concluded through your mediation. But that I should desist a person on my part is not necessary. You are the friends of both parties and when you act as mediators there can be no need of anyone else. I before addressed you a letter to the same effect, which I trust has reached you.

My friend, Bunder Abbas and its dependencies are more in a state of ruin and desolation and could not be restored under four years as more though with peace and security, Please God prosperity would return.

You mention having heard that I am coming to Kishm, such is indeed my intention if the Persians should march upon Bunder

(1990)

Abbas in order to oppose them, otherwise purpose remaining at
Muscat.

True Translation
Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident

True copy signed secretary to Government.

1990

(1991)

No. 5241 of 1854
Political Department

From:
H.L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to Govt. Bombay

To:
Captain A.B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Dated: 20th December 1854

Sir,

1. I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter with enclosures No. 2 A dated the 28th August last, relative to the piracies committed by Hamud bin Mujaddil the Amairr Chief.
2. In reply I am directed to inform you that His Lordship in Council approves of the terms of your letter to the address of Ameer Fysul, the Wahabee Ruler, and for instructions as to the course to be adopted towards Hamud bin Mujaddil for his punishment on account of the piracies he had committed, to refer you to my letters No. 3400 and 4247 dated the 2nd August and the 30th September last.
3. As regards the line of policy to be adopted by you, with reference to Bahrain I am instructed to refer you to my letter to your address No. 288 dated the 20th ultimo in which you were authorised to initiate to Amir Fysul, that the British Government will not tolerate his further interference with the affairs of that Island, and in the event of evasion or uncompliance to conspire hat chief as well as others by force of arms if necessary to desist from all hostilities on whatever pretext against the chief of Bahrain.

1991

(1992)

4. I am now desired to convey to you the authority of Government to warn Ameer Fysul and any other chief who may be disposed to afford protection to Hamud bin Mujaddil while coercive measures are in progress against him, that they will be regarded as participators in his acts of piracy and be held responsible accordingly.

Bombay Castle
20th December 1854

I have the honour to be
Signed
H. L. Anderson

True copy
H. L. Anderson

Secretary to Government

(1993)

No. 433 of 1854

From

Commodore George Robinson I. N.
Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron

To

Captain A. B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf

Dated 28th August 1854

Sir,

1. With reference to your inquiries as to the extent and description of Force that would be necessary to coerce Hamud bin Mujaddil supposing him to be located at Amich (?), or its vicinity and to be supported by the Wahabees I have the honour to state .
2. That in my opinion he should either be attacked in his present position or the whole place from Demaum to Ras Tanoorah should be blockaded by the Squadron.
3. In adopting the first of these plans, I think it would not be advisable or at least be attended with considerable risk to depend entirely on the operation, that could be effective by the Boats of the squadron in as much as the distance from the ships anchorage being so great viz. 7 or 8 miles, the Boats would in the event of any accident (such as getting a ground.) have no support. The vessels composing the squadron all draw too much water to approach near enough either to support to the Boats or for the purpose of attack were such a vessel available, a small sea-going steamer/ drawing not more that 6 feet water/ of a description similar to the late "anadne" or "Medusa" would/ accompanied by the Boats of the squadron/ appear to me to offer the most promising means of attack as at high water/ especially during the springs/ such a vessel could get comparatively close in to the position occupied by Hamud bin Mujjadil sees or destroy his Boats and move out again, if necessary, with the boats in tow before the tides fell. The season for this operation should be sometime from April to

1993

(1994)

4. October inclusive and should not, I think, be undertaken during the winter months.
5. The plan of blockading the Ports the certainly a most arduous and tedious duty, being simple enough, requires no remark, but I am of opinion to do it effectively three vessels would be required and this would render it necessary to increase the strength of the squadron during such period as the blockade is sustained; as I conclude, the effects of such a measure would be most severely felt during the pearl fishing season, perhaps that would be the best period for enforcing it.

I have to honour to be

Signed

Commodore George Robinson I. N.
Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron

Honourable Company's Sloop "Clive" at sea
28th August 1854

True copy

Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf

(1995)

No. 6 of 1854

From

Captain A. B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To. A. Malet Esquire
Chief Secretary to Bombay Govt.
Secret Department

Dated 28th February 1954

Sir,

In continuation of my dispatch in this Department No. 2 dated 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to enclose for the information of Govt. translated extract from a letter to my address from the Agent at Bahrain reporting the deputation a second time of Ali bin Ibraheem to Egypt in charge of some more horses presented by Shaikh Mohammed bin Khaleefa to Abbas Pasha. The tenor of the advice said to have been given by Rustom Effendi to the chiefs of bahrain would appear to confirm the former report of Haji Jassem to the effect that the viceroy of Egypt had declined ¹ us yet to interfere with their affairs in relation with the Wahabee ruler.

I have the honour to be etc.

Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident in Persian Gulf

Residency in the Persian Gulf
Bushire 28th February 1854

¹ Vide Enclosure: 1 to letter adverted to

(1996)

Translated Extract

From Hajee Jassem

Agent to Bahrein

To.

Captain A. B. Kemball

Residents in the Persian Gulf

Dated 20th Jumadee ool awul / 19th February

Received 20th February 1954

Adverting to my former report regarding the Agent of Abbas Pasha and the messenger of Ameer Fysul, I beg to inform you that these parties left Bahrain on the 12/11th instant for Ajoor (?). It had been the intention of Shaikh Mohammed bin Khuleefa to pay nothing to Fysul's agent unless the following discussion took place on the subject between him and Rustom Effendi. The Shaikh observed to the latter "I received letters from Abbas Pasha touching my relations with Fysul wherein he referred me in all such matters to you and you likewise wrote to me from Jibbul Shummer. In reply I explain to you my wishes but you did not wait to receive my communications. In the meantime a letter reached me from Abdullah bin Fysul regarding the tribute and his intention to depute an Agent for it.¹ I begged him to differ his requisitions but now the man has come it is not my intention to give him anything and I wish to consult you on the matter. I engaged to pay Ameer Fysul 4000 dollars on condition that he would expel the parties located / refugees. At Demaum for that all my dependence seceding from Bahrein proceeded and took asylum there. Therefore / as he had not fulfilled this condition I will pay nothing."

Rustom Effendi replied "in the first place your Agent had not moot this subject of tribute (to Abbas Pasha) and with reference to the parties at Demaum a remedy may be found. For the present therefore pay the amount stipulated to Fysul in order that he may have no pretext against you, and as your Agent is about to proceed for Egypt write to the Viceroy, and represent fully your wishes which does not appear to have been done by your envoy. In short Shaikh Mohammed bin Khuleefa

¹ Reported to this effect in a former letter

(1997)

paid the whole sum to Fysul's Agent so at least I am told, and the latter left with Rustom Effendi as above stated. The present forwarded by the Shaikh to Abbas Pasha consists of ten horses ¹ and 9 Dromedaries - 8 of the former they say being for the Viceroy and the other two one for Rustom Effendi and one for Yacoob Bay (his colleague). Ali bin Ibraheem the Shaikhs envoy did not leave for two days after them, intending to join them at Aojeer. He with Yacoob Bey will start together (for Egypt), but Rustom Effendi will remain in Nejd going among the Northern ARabs to purchase horses.

True translated extracts
Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf

True Copy
Signed H. R Disbrowe
Assistant Resident Persian Gulf
True Copies
Signed
Acting Secretary to Government

¹ including two procured from the Huwajir in Guttur reported in previous communications

(1998)

No. 19 of 1854

Secret Department

From

Captain A. B. Kemball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To.

H. L. Anderson Esquire

Secretary Govt. Bombay

Dated 31st October 1854

Sir,

With advertence to late occurrences at Bahrain I have the honour to transcribe for the information of Government and extract from a private letter to my address date 5 instant from the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia which bears upon the subject, and received importance from the rank and position of the person whose sentiments it conveys. The passage in Colonel Rawlinson's communication is as follows:

"I suspect that Ahmed Effendi will persuade the Porte to enter its protest against any interference on our part with Kutiffe he seems to have made out a pretty strong case historically for reckoning Kutiffe among the dependencies of the Turkish Ayalit of Lahsa which is now formed (so he says but at any rate granted by patent) to the Wahabee Chief by the Governor general H. E. Hejjaz. Ahmed Effendi indeed has been perpetually enquiring why our ships interfere between Bahrain and Kuttife and on what possible ground we impinge the Porte's right to the Territory of Lahsa. It is possible that the recent troubles are owing to Wahabee intrigues set on foot at Turkish instigation.

Ahmed Effendi is the late Turkish Ambassador to the Court of Persia who passed through Bagdad on his return to Constantinople. Historically I believe arguments would be found to have been already anticipated by British Functionaries and more especially by the then resident of the Persian Gulf in a letter to the Hon'ble Company's Agent

1998

(1999)

and Consul General in Egypt written¹ so far back as 30th August 1839 and has proposed protest would labour under the disadvantage of having been preceded some 15 years by that of the English Govt. against Turkish interference with the affairs of Bahrain as well as by more than one remonstrance² addressed in the intervening period to the Ottoman Ministers on the same subject. The Effendi's remarks however, certainly justify the inference suggested by Colonel Rawlinson and may even explain the attempt made from the Wahabee Coast to surprise and capture the island in July last.

I have the honour to be
Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Residency in the PG
Bushire 31st October 1854
True Copy
Signed
Secretary of Government

¹ Enc. In No. 92 S. D. of same date.

² Vide more particularly

No. 334 S. D. of 31st July 1847

No. 447 S. D. of 22nd October 1847

No. 521 S. D. of 26th November 1847

No. 535 S. D. of 14th December 1847

1999

(2000)

Sir,

The enclosed translation _ two in number _ the one extract from a letter¹ from our Agent at Muscat, the other portion of a precis received from Shiraz -- will give you the latest intelligence I possess regarding the continued contest between the Persians and H. H. the Imam, and I have the honour to submit them accordingly for your information.

I have the honour to be,

Signed

H. F. Disbrowe

Assistant Resident

True Copy

Signed

H. F. Disbrowe

Assistant Resident PG

Incharge local duties Bushire

Translated substance of a few extracts from a precis of Intelligence received on the 18th of September from our British Agent at Shiraz on the 26th Zilkaada 1270/ 21st August 1854 by order of the prince was the adjutant of Abdullah Khan's regiment flogged for having incited the men of the corps to take refuge in a sanctuary that being done His Royal Highness set the minds of the Sirbaz at ease, and brought them forth from their place of asylum. Abdullah Khan, (the sword of the State) and Raza Koollee Khan who commands the Fowj-I-Arab, were both put in orders to proceed to Bunder Abbas the former with 1000 men and two guns, the latter with 800 and two guns and this day did the Prince review the troops preparatory to their making a start, which will take place within a few days of this date, Abdullah Khan leaving first and Raza Koollee Khan following after.

It is plain so soon as the troops and field pieces arrive the Arabs will take to the sea and when the Sirbaz return from the place, they will throw themselves into the Bunder again. For the Persians to retain possession of Bunder Abbas is a matter attended with difficulty for in the first place

¹ For encl. 1 vide encl. 2 in a letter from assistant resident to secretary to Government No. 316 dated 7th September 1854

(2001)

their internal economy and arrangements are bad and the heats in the summer are excessive and in the next place they have not the boats or the ships that be needed on the 28th idem/ 28th August 1854. H. R. H. Directed Abdul Husain Khan Sirbaz of the artillery to hand over two guns to Abdullah Khan to accompany him on his expedition. Owing to the lack of horses, however, nothing was done in the matter for a number of days until after encountering thousand of difficulties one field piece was equipped and got ready and conveyed to the camp of Abdullah Khan by the Sirbaz in person. The second gun they say will presently follow.

News reached Shiraz this day to the effect that Abbas Khan maternal uncle to the Prince, who fled from Bunder Abbas has taken up his position in the Fort of Kumeez and H. R. H. in consequence of the receipt of the above Intelligence has issued orders for the whole of Sirbaz that were originally with him and had now become scattered to assemble in a body and rejoin Abbas Khan at the above mentioned Fort, their to remain until the arrival of Abdullah Khan (the sword of the state).

The corps now garrisoning the town of Isfahan will shortly come to Shiraz it is said.

On the third instant (Zilhijjah)/ 27th August Abdullah Khan marched on Bunder Abbas with his troops. The Prince is straining every nerve to do something effective (against the Arabs).

On the 7th idem / 1st September 1854 Raza Koollee Khan reviewed his regiment the Fowj-I-Arab. Only 400 men fell in the ranks. And 800 in the stipulated strength of the corps. H. R. H. is striving all in his power to dispatch the Fowj-I-Arab as early as possible but so scattered are the men among the districts and Eals (?) that they can scarcely be ready so soon as was contemplated.

True copy

Signed H. F. Disbrowe

Assistant Resident PG

True translated substance

Signed H. F. Disbrowe

Incharge local duties Bushire

Assistant Resident PG

(2002)

Translation

From

Capt. A. B. Kemball

Resident in the PG

To

H. H. Ameer Fysul

Chief of the Wahabees

Date 26th August 1854

I have the honour to inform Your Highness of my visit to this quarter, with the view of obtaining responsibility from Hamud bin Mujaddil ul Amairee for the numerous piracies of which he has been guilty but finding that he had taken up the position at Kunseh(?) and apprehending that any proceedings against him might prove offensive to yourself, I have thought proper to suspend operations until I could refer the question to Your Highness, as well as to my own superiors. Your Highness will readily understand that the impunity already so long enjoyed by this individual, can not fail to embolden other disorderly characters and as he has himself shown no disposition to relinquish his evil forces, I rely with confidence upon the determination you have so often expressed to cooperate with the British Govt. in maintaining the peace of these seas. In order to deprive him of the hope he indulges by seeking an asylum in your Territory of evading the penalty due to his crimes.

Three years ago, after peace had been concluded, between your highness and Shaikh Mohammed bin Khuleefa, the chief of Bahrain, the above mentioned individual who appears then to have been a partisan of the latter captured two boats belonging to Katif plundered their cargoes and carrying the crew to Genneh murdered four of their number in cold blood and sold or ransomed the remainder more lately hearing of a Koweit vessel in distress near Mooseylimah he put out in 7 boats from Genneh cut away the shores which supported her and appropriated everything on board, and now awaiting himself of the late disorders at Bahrein, without any previous declaration of war and under the pretext of supporting the cause of Mohammed bin Abdullah captured 7 boats belonging to that island

(2003)

engaged in trades which he still detains. The details of the two first instances recorded together with the names of the parties concerned are submitted to your Highness in an enclosure to this letter. As the circumstances of the third case are too notorious to need recapitulation, I confine myself to inscribing in the same paper the names of the owners of the piratical vessels.

In as much as Shaikh Mohammed bin Abdullah repudiated any intention to molest vessels at sea in his passage to Bahrain it is clear that he is unable to control such lawless partisans as Hamud bin Mujaddil and I am under the necessity therefore of making this appeal to your Highness. In the event of his continuing to reside under your protection I feel assured that your Highness will not only require him to make reparation to the parties he has injured but further inflict upon him the punishment he so fully deserves. Otherwise I trust that you will expel him from your territories in order that the requisite measures may be taken against him. Your Highness must be sensible that the British Govt. will never tolerate or overlook piratical proceedings of this nature nor will spare any trouble by every means in its power to obtain satisfaction.

True translation

Signed A. B. Kemball

Resident PG

True Copy signed A. B. Kemball

Resident PG

(2004)

Beni Yas

Captain Kemball informs us at the close of his sketch of the Beni Yas tribe that a hollow Treaty of Peace on land was concluded between the Joasmee and Aboothabee chiefs in the month of July 1843 that the latter at the supposed instigation of the Chief of Debayee hastened to break the peace¹ by proceeding on a foray and plundering the Beni Kuttub Ghufлах and Naeem Bedouin Tribes, in alliance with the Joasmee, the greater portion of whom were themselves away on the Batinah Coast, and finally he tells us that promises to restore the plunder were made by Khuleefa bin Shakboot which it was supposed he never meant to fulfil.

Such was the posture of affairs at Aboothabee towards the close of the year 1843, and in such a condition did they remain until the summer of the ensuing year when we gather from reports furnished by the British Agent at Shargah that Khuleefa bin Shakboot set out in the commencement of the summer months on a tour of the country around, and contrived by a rare combination of dexterity and skill to induce the very Tribes he had but lately been plundering to forsake the Joasmee and enter in alliance with himself. Other tribes too did he manage to win, over to his side indeed he appears to have conciliated the whole of the People he met with for Syud Hamood bin Azan² quitted his Territories and repaired to Brymee to meet him Syed Kahlan bin Syf, the Governor of

¹ August 1843 and September 1843

² Chief of Sohar

(2005)

Shimas hastened to wait upon him and with one and all was he said to have entered into a close and strict confederacy.

While at Brymee too he invites Shaikh Mukhtoom of Debaie to go and join him, telling him he was anxious to settle the feuds existing between himself and the people of Ghuflah, the Debaie Chief however, somewhat mistrustful of Khuleefa bin Shakbool's motives politely declining³ the kind invitation he had received on the plea of the expected arrival of a Government vessel at his Port, deputed his brother Saeed bin Butye to proceed and wait upon him instead of himself.

In the month of December of the same year, after Shaikh Khuleefa had returned to Aboothabee, occurred an affair that led to endless correspondence and trouble, which I will endeavour to describe in the fewest possible words.

Shaikh Faris the Chief of Chaab, at a time when all was peace and quiet took into his head without the slightest provocation and upon the frivolous pretext of a claim he possessed upon the Aboothabee Tribe of more than 30 years standing to seize and detain a Buteel belonging to the subjects of Shaikh Khuleefa bin Shakboot that happened to touch the Port of Mohumra.

The aggression as uncalled for as it was sudden, led to an appeal to the Resident by the Shaikh of Aboothabee who begged that officer either to cause full reparation to be afforded him or to permit him to proceed with his maritime Forces against the presumptuous Shaikh Faris.

The Resident after inquiring into the particulars of the case, and finding that the Chaab Chief had acted in a most unjustifiable manner addressed a communication to Shaikh Faris pointing out unto him the injustice of his behaviour and advising him to release the Buteel and everything pertaining unto her. Shaikh Faris not only disregarded this appeal to his feelings but expressed his intention to commit further injuries upon the people of Aboothabee unless their Chief chose to make good the claim he insisted he had a full right to demand. Claims, it may here be observed that not only referred to occurrences which transpired previous to Shaikh Khuleefa assuming the reins of govt. but which also were found to have been forfeited by the course of subsequent events.

³ 1844

(2006)

Such was the language held by the chief of the Chaab high and mighty it must be admitted notwithstanding however the haughty tone of the reply Major Hennell determined ere leaving the respective chiefs to decided there quarrel by a recourse to hostilities to depute his assistant Capt. Kemball to remonstrate with the wavered Shaikh Faris to point out unto him the folly of the conduct he was so blindly pursuing and in fine to strive and induce him to give up the Buteel and her cargo.

\ Capt. Kemball proceeded accordingly in the H. C. Schooner "Emily" on the performance of the duty assigned him but was unable on arrival at Mohumrah. Though Shaikh Faris was but two days journey in land and though he was allowed a period of 11 days to make his appearance to obtain an interview with the Chief who carried his want of courtesy so far as to omit replying to a written communication he received from the officer deputed to meet him. The mission therefore of necessity failed¹

Major Hennell still anxious to prevent warfare and bloodshed referred the matter to Colonel Sheil the British minister at the Capital, who transmitted in reply a firman from the Shah and a letter from Hajee Meerza Aghasee ² to Suleyman Khan. The sirteep in command at Mohumrah, directing him to cause the restitution of the Buteel and her cargo or its value amounting to about 150 tomans.

Even this did not produce the desired effect, as might well have been expected at once. Recourse was had to shifts and (?) evasions. The Buteel should be delivered up, but not so her Cargo. the cargo should be surrendered, but a portion retained and it was, not until fresh orders had been elicited from the Persian Prime Minister and forwarded to the Resident for delivery that the matter was finally settled. In the month of May 1845 the Beni Yas Buteel and her stores were recovered and handed over to Lieut. Ford who had been deputed in the H. C. Schooner "Constance" to obtain her release.

We now arrive at a point in our history that deserves more than our usual attention -- a series of changes as rapid as they were violent as mild in results as they were grave in character, at this time occurred that

¹ February 3rd 1845

¹ 1845

² The Persian Prime Minister

(2007)

cause us to look back amazement and wonder at the inexplicable manner in which the storm blew over.

We are struck with horror at the crimes that were committed. We behold with astonishment the apathy displayed by those who witnessed the crime. We see an assassin replaced by an assassin who in his term makes way for another assassin. We expect to find the tribe convulsed and thrown into the utmost disorder. We meet with naught but peace and contentment. We observe at last the rightful heir to the Chief ship peaceably assume the rights that belonged to him. Such a succession of revolutions we most assuredly never beheld. Let us proceed to run over as briefly as possible the facts connected with the deeds I refer to Khuleefa bin Shakboot³ succeeded to the chieftainship of Aboothabee in 1833 after having with the assistance of his younger Brother Sultan killed his elder brother Tahnoon.

From that time¹ to the present, he remained at the head of the Tribe and by his gallantry, firmness and prudence raised it to one of the most powerful of the maritime and Inland Communities of the PG. He moreover even showed himself disposed to cultivate a good understanding with the British Govt. and strove not without success to restrain his people and dependence from committing irregularities at seas. Such was the character of Shaikh Khuleefa bin Shakboot who in the month of July 1845 together with his brother fell victim to the revenge Esvi bin Khalid. The latter chief as it should seem had long meditated carrying this plan into effect but owing to a favorable opportunity not presenting itself deferred its perpetration until a time when the town of Aboothabee was nearly denuded of inhabitants who had gone for the most part to the date Groves in the neighboring districts. Then considering the season had arrived for thinking, the blow did he repair to meet the unsuspecting Shaikh Khuleefa and his brother on the Beach and after partaking of an entertainment that was spread. Under the shade of a Buteel he rose with his dons and other accomplices and slew Shaikh Khuleefa and his brother having committed this dastardly act, he assumed the reins of govt. summoned the heads of the Tribes around and was quickly acknowledged -- the chief of the place. Scarcely, however, had Esvi bin Khalid been in power

³ Captain Kembal's memorandum

¹ From 1833 to July 4th 1845

(2008)

a couple of months ere he an (?) assassin, was assassinated by one Zaab bin Esai who in his term fell a prey to the revenges of Khalid bin Esai the son of the murdered Esai bin Khalid.

The latter chief who brought the scenes of bloodshed and murder to a close did not attempt to usurp the authority he had managed to destroy but left Aboothabee and returned to sharjah after a slight skirmish with some people of the Beni Yas. His brother however, contrived to get possession of the fort of Aboothabee whence he was speedily ejected by the Beni Yas under the command of two influential leaders named Mohammad bin Hamud and Rashid bin Fazil.

These chiefs declared their intention to restrain the authority they had gained until the arrival of Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon who was considered the rightful heir to the chiefship and had been invited to come and assume it. In due course, Shaikh Saeed arrived and finding himself well received by the majority of the Beni Yas Tribe, and also that he was supported by the Resident who had been studiously watching the course of events and now hastened to give all the moral aid in his power to ensure the establishment in authority of the lawful chief. He at once placed himself at the head of affairs and was speedily recognised by the whole of the Beni Yas as their true and rightful chief.

Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon had not been long installed in his new position ere he received and accepted overtures to enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with the hereditary enemy of his tribe, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. Then the Beni Yas chief was induced to listen to proposals of such a nature from one bearing the name of Joasmee it is hard to comprehend.

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(2008)

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How he endorsed the people of his tribe to act in concert with those of Shaikh Sultan is more incomprehensible still -- that he did so however is certain. The Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs united cordially for the purpose of crushing Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butye and his allies of Ejmaun and Amulgaumine and they remained in alliance until the commencement of the Year 1847 when difference of opinion arising regarding a proposed attack upon the town of Debayee eruption shortly after ensued.

Shaikh Sa'eed bin Tahnoon deserted by the Joasmee and perceiving no hopes of reducing Debayee, thought it advisable now

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From here onward.

(2008/1)

that he stood alone and moreover, having as he did, that the Wahabee lieutenant owed him a grudge for an attack he had made upon the people of Ghufila to strive and communicate Shaikh Makhtoom bin Butyee. The Jaosmee pursued the self same policy and succeeded in gaining his object. Sheikh Saeed, however, requiring the Bedouins of the Bein Guttub to be included as Parties to the treaty about to be concluded and the Debai Chief refusing to admit them difficulties presented themselves that only found a solution in angry words and disputes and somewhat thus did matters remain until early in the succeeding year when Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon encrused at the treachery of the sons of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur in making an insidious attack upon the fort of Ejmaun and responding to the invitation of Sheikh Mukhtoom bin Butye whose turn is now was to make overtures consorted to join in alliance with the rest of the Maritime Chiefs leaving the Joasmee and his treacherous sons stand alone and to comment the folly of their perfidious behaviour. The alliance, however, was merely nominal and did not, as far as I can ascertain, lead to a direct aggression upon the Joasmee Dominions.

Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon, shortly after detaching himself from the rest of the Tribes none of whom appeared inclined to do more than to plot and intrigue the one against the other formed, the project of expelling the Wahabee Lieutenant from the Brymee Territories, a bold and daring step it must be admitted, on the accomplishment of which all the maritime chiefs were anxious to behold for they were weary of Wahabee oppression one which sought but a general coalitions of the Tribes, it was thought, could bring to pass, and jealousy precluded their coalescing one which as will be seen in the sequel, was bravely and skillfully carried out by the Beniayas Chief and which led too great increase of his power one which compelled the crest fallen Wahabee to crave the assistance of the rest of the Tribes and induced Sheikh Saeed who, though unaided by others, shrank not from a conflict with all the troops they could summon to agree to a Peace and to give back the Forts he had so ably possessed himself of. Let us briefly relate the mode in which all these things were accomplished.

Sheikh Saeed invited Sheikh Syf bin Hamood, the son of the Sohar Chief, as also the Head of the Naeem Tribe, to enter into an alliance with himself; they did so and made preparations to join him, their aim and plan

(2008/2)

was one. They resolved to crush and trample under foot the high, aspiring and boastfully Wahabee.

The Beniayas impatient of delay and calculating his own strength as well as the weakness of the enemy, determined to proceed to work at once and not to wait the approach of his allies. Promptness of action was the chief thing needful. The Minoo Lieutenants as all events could be fought and conquered, of not the great Lieutenant himself. On the 4th of May, accordingly, did he write his won troops and a number of men from the zowahir, awamir and other subordinate Tribes, hasten to attack Sheikh Syf bin Ali who held command of one of the Wahabee Forts in the zowahir country. Resistance was offered but not with success. The fort, with all it contained, was quickly surrendered in tot he hands of Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon, who was wise and to rest content with the laurels he had won, and to await the arrival of his expected allies, ere venturing to beard the lion in his den at Brymee. These shortly arrived, and on the 16th of June did operations commence in right good earnest against the stronghold of Brymee. The one, Soobanh, was occupied by Mahomed bin Syful Ujaye in person, and after a commonade of two days duration was compelled to surrender. Mahomed bin Syf, however, was not to be found - he had basely deserted his followers and unknown to all the soldiers in the Fort, he, the Chief of the place, the gallant Wahabee, had fled in the dead of night, and sought refuge among the troops in the adjoining and only remaining Fort of Khunduk which so confounded even the Wahabees at the activity displayed by the enemy, so disheartened at the fall of Soobanh and the ignominious flight of the Commander they did not attempt to retain. The Fort was vacated and handed over together with the horses and property therein contained to Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon who permitted the vanquished Nedjdees to quit the place without being harmed or molested. These were great and heroic exploits no doubt sweet to Sheikh Saeed but bitter to the Wahabee and equally bitter to the rest of the maritime chiefs who, though inwardly abhorring the latter, viewed with still more of abhorrence the growing power of the former - a coalition was formed against the Beniayas. He who had forcibly ejected the Nedjdees was in his turn to be forcibly cast out from Brymee such a plan was in course of formation and such a plan had not dissensions and jealousies arisen

(2008/3)

amongst the allied parties, might well perhaps have succeeded, for the son of the Sohar Chief, swung to a misunderstanding between himself and the Beni-yas, was suddenly expelled the Fort of Brymee, and thus was Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon left to contend single-handed against the formidable league about to be arrayed against him. No way daunted, however, and fearful for nothing, he pressed for a length of time¹ more than a match for the whole of his enemies.

He fought and shamefully discomfited² considerable Nedjdee force that was sent to annihilate him. He forced the proud and unskillful Sheikh Saeed bin Mootluk to flee for protection to Shargah. He showed himself ready to confront the combined forces of the Nedjdee, Joasmee, Debayee and Ejmaun Chiefs. He experienced but one reverse, and that but a slight one when finding he was not likely to receive the succor promised by the Muscat Govt., he gave ear to the voice of a mediator who had been sent by the Shureef of Mecca to conciliate the contending parties.

A peace was concluded by the term of which the Brymee fort³ were restored to Saad bin Mootluk all that had passed was to be buried in oblivion and all parties were to return to the status *co ente bellum*. Judging from the subsequent movement of Sheikh Saeed, however it doesn't appear that he had any intention of remaining satisfied with the settlement that had thus been affected. Peace it is true, was concluded, but his visit to Shinas - and Muscat which occurred some few months later in the seesaw was supposed to have been for the sole purpose of conforming with Syf bin Makhtoom and H.E. Syud Soweeynee on the subject of what could be done against the Wahabees. The plans that were concerted, the complications that ensued⁴ and the result of those plans and complications, all this we shall learn in the sequel. Before prosecuting however this part of our narrative, it is necessary that we should accompany our Hero home to Aboothabee and watch his proceedings on arrival.

The year had well nigh drawn to a close when Shaikh Saeed reached his seat and found to his great disgust that on the termination

¹ 1848

² November 19th Battle fought at the spring of Anjah near Kishm a place in the Aboothabee Districts

³ February 1849

(2008/4)

of the Pearl Fishery all the Boats of the Gubeysat Tribe, that should have returned to Aboothabee had proceeded to the Guttur Coast and sought an asylum at Bidda. The Gubeysa Tribe originally dwelt at Aboothabee and there continued to reside until the year 1836, when the piratical acts of the subjects of the Beniwas Chief leasing the British Govt. to demand payment of considerable sums of money by way of compensations to the injured parties, they receded and located themselves at Aderd a town situated in a Backwater between Bahrein and Aboothabee and considered by the inhabitants to be quite inaccessible to our vessels of War.

In this however they were sadly mistaken for they had scarcely taken up their positions and commenced indulging in Piracy ere Major Hennell proceeded with the Squadron of the Gulf in Command of Commodore Lowe and exacted full satisfactions for past offences in the following year (1837) they were again disturbed by Sheikh Khuleefa bin Shakboot through Chief of the Aboothabee Tribe who attacked them in their Den and completely demolished the Place. The greater portion of the Gubeysa members now scattered and powerless, were induced to go and reside once more at Aboothabee, where they remained until the present years, when partly from the dissatisfaction with which they viewed, the friendly demeanour of Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon towards the people of the Moharibah, a Tribe at Feud with themselves, and partly owing to the intrigues of Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Mukhtoom bin Butye, who assured them bin Saood would shortly send a force to rebuild Adees and relocated them therein. They were led to adopt the course.¹ I have described of proceeding to Bidda.

The intrigues of his enemies, the cause of the secession, the mischief likely to emanate there from all these things were perceived at a glance by the discerning Sheikh Saeed.

He resolved to imp the evil in the bud and by promptness of actions to crush the disaffected spirit of the offending members. The measures he adopted bore impress of his wanted energy but we regret to add were far removed from the uprightness and honesty of spirit, that have hitherto been the principal characteristics of his dealings with others. He seized the Head and Rulers of the Tribes still left an Aboothabee and cast them

¹ October, 1849

(2008/5)

into prison. He deputed a messenger to Cajole and coax the seesaw to return to their homes.

He received and welcomed them on return, with marks of the utmost kindness and respect. He gave them every reason to believe that past offences were forgiven and forgotten, that they were no longer laboring under the displeasure of their Chief. In short, he smiled...
(continued on page 2009)

(2009)

smiled and gazed upon them with fond affection and threw them into a state of unsuspecting security what then I would ask must have been their surprise and horror when the day succeeding their arrival dawned upon them to awake and find their boats have been stripped in the night of sails masts and rudders in other words that means of escape had been deceitfully snatched from their hands to find orders had been issued to the people of Aboothabee that all parties possessing claims upon the Guhaj Tribe were to enforce immediate payment that a fine of no less than 2000 dollars was inflicted upon them. In fine to perceive that they have been cruelly deceived and ensnared by one whom they never suspected of deceit, the position they were in was a painful and they were driven to the greatest of straits and so much pressed for payment of the money demanded that they had no resource but to dispose of their boats and all the goods they possessed.

We now revert to the proceedings and doings of Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon and H. E. Syud soweeynee they entered into a strict alliance and set on fast preparation for acting offensively against the Wahabee lieutenant in Oman. Such at least was the ostensible reason for which they united and such too was the new and sole desire of the Beni Yas chief who was anxiously belonging for an opportunity to drive the Nedjdees at the point of the sword. Over more from their position of Brymee H. E. however had many plans in contemplation he wished to oppose the ambitious designs of the Joasmee against Khar Zakown and his either possessions on the Batinah coast he was anxious to persuade or failing persuasion to compel the Sohar Chief to Coalesce with himself and the Beni Yas all these matters have been so fully discussed in my sketch of the Muscat Tribe that to repeat them here were idle. I shall confine myself therefore as for us I can take relation of the movements of Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon throughout the coming complication¹. The first mention we find of the despatch of Troops by the Beni Yas chief in the direction of the Wahabee position is in the month of March 1850² when 400 men of the Beni Yas and Moonassir Tribes joined H. E. Syed Soweeynee at Shinas. Having been sent by Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon under the command of his cousin Mohammed bin Syf and Fazil bin Mohammed as the Shaikh Saeed

¹ 1850

² Brymee Letter from British Agent at Sharja to Resident dated March 25th 1850

(2010)

Himself he proceeded with a large force to the immediate vicinity of Brymee and Commenced destroying the water courses that irrigated the date trees around -- meanwhile the continued forces of the Joasmee, Debaie, Ejmaun and Amulgavine Chiefs arrived on the spot and luckily for Shaikh Saeed, perhaps the ends and arms of the allies were opposed the one to the other. The two of their number had wishes alike.

The Joasmee had in his mind greedy expectations of aggrandizement on the Batinah Coast.

Shaikh Mukhtoom possessed but one desire that of expelling Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon from the Brymee territories.

The minor chiefs of Ejmaun and Amulgavine whose contingents were small compared with the rest appear to have had no fixed purpose or object whatever. In short, after some discussion and not a little hesitation the Joasmee Councils prevailed and a move was made in the direction of Sohar when commenced the operations against the Forts of Shinas and others that have been as fully recounted in the Muscat Territory.

The exact course pursued by the Beni Yas after the departure of the Allies, I know not. He would seem, however, after perpetrating all manner of mischief in the plantations and come try adjacent of Brymee, to have gone ¹back to Aboothabee. And there to have remained for a while, when he again returned to Brymee, and amused² himself foraying the districts of Sharjah and Rasel Khymah and engaging in skirmishes with Mohammed bin Abdullah and the Tribe of the Naum at Bookhureyban.

He does not appear to have afforded active support to H. E. Syud Soweenee against the Joasmee confederacy and as regards the subsequent aggressions upon the Brymee Territories with which we are more immediately concerned no further mention is made of the subject until the month of November of the present year when to our utter surprise and astonishment we find the Joasmee, Beni Yas and Naeem Chiefs acting in concert against the Nedjee garrison at Brymee -- a strange and sudden coalition indeed -- a complete revolution of affections -- to say nothing of the sudden renewal of friendship and amity between the Chiefs of the Beni Yas and Naeem so lately at feud with each other that the Beni Yas and Joasmee should have united for any end whatsoever was

¹ No. 58 of 1850 from Commodore Porter to Col. Hennell

² Letter from Moolla Hoosein to Col. Hennell September 7th 1850

(2011)

wondrous strange but that the Joasmee should join the Beni Yas for the purpose of inflicting injury upon the people of the Ameer was more than strange, it was incomprehensible quite yet, so it was, and such did really occur, for we are told by Colonel Hennell in one of his letters¹ to Govt. that the members of the Naeem Tribe had in conjunction with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur of Ras el Khymah and Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon of Aboothabee succeeded in compelling the Nedjee garrison of Brymee to evacuate that Fort which is now in the possessions of the Naeem.

The present year² as also the one preceding it, were notice for the number of disputes that occurred between the people of Aboothabee and those of Debaie regarding the seizure and counter seizure of slaves from Boats at sea. These were all satisfactorily settled and adjusted through the endeavors of Col. Hennell and the remonstrations he addressed to the Chiefs of the respective Tribes.

In the Autumn³ of 1850 took place a gross violation of the maritime truce by the subjects of the Beni Yas chiefs who seized upon a boat of Humreeah and slew two of the crew on Boat of her.

The vessels of war were despatched to demand and satisfaction from Shaikh Saeed bin Sahnoon in the shape of the payment of 600 dollars, the sum required as the Daeah or price of blood for the for the Joasmees slain and the surrender of the captured. Himreeah Boat with the stores pertaining unto her.

The boldness displayed by Lieut. Manners in command of the Tigris as also by Lieut. Trouson of the Euphrates in taking their vessels through the intricate channel that leads for upwards of 3 miles to the Inner Harbour of the Port of Aboothabee thereby bringing them within effective gunshot range of both the town and the native craft on the beach somewhat astonished Shaikh Saeed bin Sahnoon, who had never before beheld a British cruiser so close to his home and led him to comply with the requisition preferred against him without hesitation or demur. The 600 Dollars were paid⁴, and the boat and stores surrendered so soon as demanded.

¹ No. 129 of 1850 from Col. Hennell to A. Malet Esquire dated December 22nd 1850

² 1850 and 1849

³ Letter 112 of 1850 from Col. Hennell to A. Malet Esquire and November 1st 1850 besides previous despatches